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Concerns about inadequate radio communications at the scene of disasters predate 
9/11, and have been a focal point of homeland security funding since 2001. Under the 
umbrella term “interoperability,” grant funding is facilitating the recent deployment of 
equipment to allow field personnel to patch radio systems together, with the expectation 
of immediate improvement of emergency scene communications dysfunction. 
This thesis argues that there are numerous causal factors for inadequate disaster 
communications. Communications impediments include insufficient radio infrastructure, 
behavioral reactions by people in stressful situations, intergovernmental relations, 
inadequate procedures and training, and general lethargy over the need to institute special 
operating policies differing from routine practices. 
The sole reliance upon technological solutions, without proportionate training and 
practice greatly reduces the effectiveness of radio patching equipment. Quite opposite 
from the intended effect, patching equipment, in the hands of those only minimally 
acclimated to radio system architecture, is likely to trigger unintended consequences of 
chaotic system overload (by combining two or more busy channels) and sector 
vulnerability (by combining unsecured general public systems with previously isolated 
public safety systems). 
Our goal is to provide a thought-provoking examination of the entire realm of 
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America’s first responders—police, fire, emergency medical and allied 
professionals are faced with the arduous task of protecting our communities. One of the 
most pressing issues emerging in the post-9/11 era is the need to improve emergency 
scene radio communications. This concern actually pre-dates the terrorist attacks on 
America in 2001, and has been a commonly-cited issue after nearly every disaster or 
incident of major significance. The call for action has quickened in pace during the first 
half of this decade, and is sure to continue as a major issue in homeland security circles 
for years to come. 
The one word on people’s lips to describe the concern is “interoperability.” While 
it had been used in limited circles throughout the 1990s, interoperability has only gained 
widespread integration into the parlance of emergency planners and responders during 
the last few years. Interoperability has been misapplied as a catch-all phrase to describe a 
multitude of issues surrounding emergency scene communications. Over the last two 
years, interoperability has risen to the top of the priority list for agencies seeking 
homeland security grant funding. Interoperability projects have a better chance of 
successful funding, and conversely, projects not demonstrating an appropriate level of 
interoperability consideration will be rejected or significantly scored lower in the review 
process.1 Meetings and seminars on interoperability fill-up quickly and there is an 
element of frenzy and scrambling for jurisdictions to address interoperability. Yet, with 
all that said, many people would be hard-pressed to come up with a definition for 
“interoperability” and of those who did, wide variance would likely be noted.  
 
                                                 
1 “…each urban area receiving FY05 UASI funds must develop a plan to achieve tactical interoperable 
communications across jurisdictions in the urban area and test the plan through the exercise activity 
required for the IED scenario. Each state that does not have a designated urban area(s) must use the same 
multi-jurisdictional metropolitan area or region designated to test the prevention and response plans…” 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Office of Domestic Preparedness, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, Program 
Guidelines and Application Kit, 2004, 52. 
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Is it police officers being able to talk to firefighters at the same incident; local fire 
officials talking to neighboring fire agencies? Are we talking about federal agencies with 
radio connection to state and local officials? Is it at the scene, or command post, or 
Emergency Operations Center? Will it be provided for every responder, or command-to-
command, only? Or does it address the wider issue of radio system coverage, frequency 
spectrum capacities, technology piece ergonomics, and alternate (non-voice) 
communications methods? 
This thesis argues that there is a larger, unacknowledged and unaddressed human 
factors issue of needing new procedures involved in the communications process, and 
that we have misjudged the real issue as being purely technological. The result has been 
the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars, (with some estimates of all homeland 
security grants now topping $1.5 billion dollars), on communications patching equipment 
predicated on the assumption that emergency scene communication will instantly and 
automatically be improved once the equipment is bought and plugged-in.2 The 
complexities of the communications process need greater examination and modification 
before any turnkey solution will bring meaningful result. 
The reader is provided with communications improvement alternatives, which 
should be carefully weighed and tailored by first responder policy makers, while devising 
a policy best suited for their local jurisdiction. Operating practices and regional variations 
make it difficult and undesirable for the thousands of police and fire departments across 
the U.S. to operate exactly the same. Despite minor regional differences, the overriding 
need to cooperatively work together, in the spirit and intent of homeland security 
initiatives dictates the development of common practices and policies that will help first 
responders bridge these regional differences. One aspect of needed common practice and 
policies involves new procedures for use by first responders when using radio equipment 
designed to improve interoperability. 
 
 
                                                 




The public servants in our communities—America’s firefighters, law enforcement 
officers, emergency medical personnel, and a host of allied professionals, provide the 
first-line of defense and protection to our communities in times of crisis—both small and 
large-scale. During the evolutionary path we have traveled in securing the American 
homeland after the attacks of September 11, 2001, one phrase has resonated: All 
Disasters Are Local.3 Those four simple words acknowledge a complex reality, a 
powerful message on the awesome responsibility placed upon thousands of first 
responders, in communities large and small, nationwide. It also acknowledges that the 
size of our country and the deployment of local resources for daily emergencies make 
local first responders the only logical focal point of immediate response to attacks and 
other disasters. 
 
A. INTEROPERABILITY PRIORITY #1 
1. Salient Issues 
1. Communications continues to be listed as a major issue in post-
disaster after-action reports. 
2. Hundreds of millions of dollars in homeland security funds have 
been spent to address the lack of “interoperable” radio 
communications. 
3. The procedures employed by first responders during radio 




                                                 
3 “As James Lee Witt, former director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is 
famous for saying, ‘All disasters are local.’” Frances Edwards-Winslow, Ph.D., “Telling It Like It Is: The 
Role of the Media In Terrorism Response and Recovery,” Perspectives on Preparedness, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, August 2002, 2. 
 
2 
Nationwide, numerous reports have identified a problem with radio 
communications at the scene of disasters, yet the assumption has incorrectly been that the 
problem is largely a technical one; once disparate radios are connected, effective 
operational communications will result.4 The posture, heretofore, has been that 
communications will improve if more users are added together on the same channels.  
This is a flawed, counterintuitive assumption on two major fronts: 
1. Superfluous radio transmissions contribute to the sensory overload of 
personnel at the emergency scene, clouding the attainment of an accurate 
operational picture for all involved. 
2. Radio spectrum is a limited commodity—once it’s full, it’s full. Even if 
700 megahertz channels are opened for full use later this decade, there will 
always be a practical limit to the number of people who can operate on a 
common platform before the quality of effective communications 
deteriorates.5 
To optimize communications resources, we need to reexamine the policies and 
practices from a procedural perspective, selecting strategies that will facilitate effective 
communications. 
The central questions of this thesis are:  
4. Whether the dominant interoperability issue is procedural, and 
5. Which procedural adaptations will enhance the crisis communications 
capabilities of the first responder community? 
Some early indicators from the first responder community are just hinting at the 
need to address the procedural, non-technical aspects of facilitating emergency 
communications.6 This is an issue we cannot simply “buy” our way out of by merely 
deploying more equipment. 
                                                 
4 Newsday, Inc., “Audio: Dramatic Radio Transmissions from September 11,” 
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/newyork/ny-tapesgallery,0,785678.htmlstory. (Accessed October 28, 
2005). 
5 While the Federal Communications Commission has reserved a block of channels for public safety 
use, many metropolitan areas are precluded from using these channels until a relatively few television 
stations migrate to digital television service. Congress is expected to act in compelling them to vacate the 
channels before the end of this decade. 
6 “Provide training and technical assistance for public safety communications and interoperability.” 




The mandate to the first responder community, post 9/11, has been to “fix” 
interoperability. Lapses in communication have been well-documented before the 
terrorist attacks of September of 2001, but it was that event which initiated a serious 
funding effort to address the issue.7 Since that time, an estimated $1.5 billion has been 
allocated to homeland security, with heavy emphasis on radio hardware to facilitate 
interoperability.8 Despite the focus on the word “interoperability” and the awarding of so 
many grants for the purpose, there is divergence in just arriving at a common definition. 
Does “interoperability” refer to configuring a radio to be able to talk to any other 
radio that may be at the scene of an emergency response? At the same traffic accident, 
state police, local police, ambulance and fire personnel may be present. Are we 
advocating all of them hearing each other, interactively sending voice radio messages to 
one another? One definition, pre-dating 9/11, came from a cross-section of industry 
professionals assigned to the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee; they define 
interoperability as “an essential communication link within public safety and public 
service wireless communication systems which permits units from two or more different 
agencies to interact with one another and to exchange information according to a 
prescribed method in order to achieve predictable results.”9  
To some, interoperability is intended for command-to-command use only. That 
sounds much more feasible than trying to coalesce all of the responders onto a single 
channel. One expert predicts “chaos” will result if we try to patch all agencies together, 
all of the time.10 Experienced first responders will readily identify that their own 
segmented channels frequently become contentious during such incidents; with so many 
units talking, they cover/“step-on” one another, hampering effective communications. 
                                                 
7 “Inadequate and unreliable wireless communications problems have been plaguing public safety 
organizations for decades." Harlin R. McEwen, “Special Focus: Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable 
COMmunications: Safecom,”  Police Chief Magazine, April 2004. 
8 Davidson, Compatible radio, 2005. 
9 Larry Irving, Final Report of the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee (PSWAC) to the 
Federal Communications Commission and the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, 1996, 49. 
10 “Of course, interoperable communications doesn't mean that all these public safety groups will talk 
to one another all the time. That's a recipe for chaos, according to Boyd [SAFECOM Director David Boyd, 
Ph.D.]. What's needed is controlled, authorized access. ‘When we talk about interoperability,’ he says, ‘we 
mean an ability for an officer to talk to whoever he or she needs to, when they need to and when authorized 
to do so.’” Pat West, “Family Talk Plan.” Fire Chief Magazine, June 2004. 
 
4 
What will the exponential loading of the channel be like if four busy channels, loaded 
with agency-specific conversations are mixed on the same radio platform? Will the 
resultant “tower of babble” be helpful to everyone at the scene? Will first responders 
readily adopt the “less is more” posture needed when combining so many critical 
communications onto one channel, (as opposed to keeping them on appropriately diverse 
communications platforms, thus enabling agency-specific communications to continue?) 
First responders will tend to revert to daily habits in times of crisis, instead of modifying 
their use of the system when many agencies have been patched together, resulting in 
communications chaos, not panacea.11 
It would be far more desirable to keep agencies on their routine operating 
platforms, clearing non-incident chatter on other incidents to separate channels. A 
compelling case can be made for an incident-specific common command channel among 
all agencies responding to the critical incident, but it must not be used as a poor substitute 
for a sound incident command system, which dictates that senior command personnel 
will congregate at a single incident command post, collaborate (face-to-face), coordinate, 
and communicate with their own personnel. The National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) has such a format at its heart and is supposed to be universally understood and 
applied, nationwide, as a condition of continued grant funding.12  
While a lot of agencies say they know and use NIMS, evidence of its field 
application is weak, especially relating to multi-agency command from a single incident 
command post. Jurisdictions claiming to be enthusiastic adopters are often hard-pressed 
to show application of NIMS principles at emergency scenes, ranging in complexity from 
the New York City attacks on 9/11 involving two 110-story buildings, to more routine 
traffic accidents and building fires.13 The reasons for slow or no adoption of NIMS 
                                                 
11 Christopher D. Wickens, John Lee, Yili Liu, and Sallie Gordon Becker, An Introduction to Human 
Factors Engineering (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004). 
12 “Jurisdictions will be required to meet the FY 2006 NIMS implementation requirements as a 
condition of receiving federal preparedness funding assistance in FY 2007.” The NIMS Integration Center, 
DHS/FEMA, National Standard Curriculum Training Development Guidance, October 2005. 
13 “The NYPD and the FDNY were two of the preeminent emergency response organizations in the 
United States. But each considered itself operationally autonomous. Each was accustomed to responding 
independently to emergencies. By September 11th neither had demonstrated the readiness to respond to an 
‘Incident Commander’ if that commander was an official outside of their Department.” National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Eleventh Public Hearing, May 18, 2004. 
 
5 
ranges from traditional resistance to change, to a state of general denial of the possibility 
that large-scale emergencies can happen in any given jurisdiction, to what may be the 
biggest factor of all—a reluctance to answer the “who’s in charge” question within areas 
of historic turf battles, especially relating to police vs. fire department rivalries, and/or 
squabbles between various levels of government. Cordiality between agencies on the 
surface can belie any evidence of NIMS application in the field. 
Traditionally, there has been a tendency by management in various organizations 
to devise hardware solutions for a whole range of challenges, instead of addressing 
human engineering issues.14 It is understandable that a “turnkey” solution is hoped for; 
the purchase and delivery of new equipment signals tangible evidence that something is 
being done. The proof of concept comes only months, and sometimes years, later. 
Considering that the kind of incidents we are preparing for are the statistically unlikely 
exceptions, occurring only perhaps once or twice in a generation, it is difficult for new 
equipment to receive a thorough assessment of effectiveness, even in the most realistic 
training exercise environment. The response to Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005 
is an early indicator, a weak signal perhaps, of the failure to really address the need 
regarding critical incident communications. These failures run counter to the expected 
result, especially after so much money has been expended with the expectations of instant 
communications improvement. “Police and other emergency agencies responding to 
Hurricane Katrina were plagued by the same communications problems exposed by the 
World Trade Center bombing in 1993, yet a solution is still considered years away.”15 
Radio interoperability is one of the many areas in which homeland security is 
evolving so fast that the need to change is outpacing the research. Much like the 
experience with the Y2K situation, where governmental agencies replaced a huge number 
of computers in a short period of time, the frenzy to answer the allegations of inefficient 
on-scene radio communications reported in the 9/11 Commission Report has led to the 
                                                 
14 Nita Lewis Miller, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and Lawrence G. Shattuck, U.S. 
Military Academy, West Point, NY., A Process Model of Situated Cognition in Military Command and 
Control, 2004. 
15 Kerr, “Lack of Interoperability,” October 16, 2005. 
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purchase of hundreds of millions of dollars of hardware.16 Yet much of the problem is 
procedural and is likely to be exacerbated by patching radio users together, instead of 
achieving the intended outcome, which is to actually facilitate better communication.17 
New patching equipment is being deployed nationwide, with little or no guidance nor 
consensus for proper use. Because of the nature of radio system architecture, patching 
equipment actually makes previously “guarded” or well managed systems vulnerable, 
because for the first time, their airtime can be impacted by users outside of their system 
(basic radio system architecture is explained later in Section II). 
Of particular interest is the deployment in recent months of NIMS and the 
formation of a center to create and issue standards on emergency scene operations, 
including communications (NIMS, 2004).18 Another document receiving attention is the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard on Disaster/Emergency 
Management and Business Continuity Programs (Standard 1600), released in 2004.19 It is 
currently undergoing debate at the committee level, and will likely undergo significant 
update and modification within its three-year review cycle. The 9/11 Commission Report 
focused considerable attention on dysfunctions present in the first responder 
community.20 It should continue to be a catalyst for change for many years to come. It is 
already attracting a lot of attention to the subject, as evidenced by the designation of 
interoperability as being the top priority for grant proposal evaluations. We are also 
starting to see the inclusion of funding for training accompanying interoperability grant 
programs, signaling some recognition of the importance of attention to non-hardware 
solutions, yet specific examples of actual training applications are difficult to find. What 
constitutes “interoperability training” is vague and nonspecific, leaving room for the 
requesting jurisdiction to include the component in their grant application. As yet, there is 
no collective recognition of the need for improved human interoperability 
                                                 
16 Y2K refers to millennial change of calendars in 2000, which triggered concern for computer system 
stability. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
17 West, “Family Talk Plan” (2004). 
18 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (NIMS), 2004. 
19 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1600: Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity Programs, Quincy, Massachusetts, 2004. 
20 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
 
7 
communications procedures, as agencies presumably expect an out-of-the-box solution, 
based on patching radio systems together. 
This thesis takes the reader through a global review of where the first responder 
community stands on addressing interoperability. With a specific intent to remain largely 
“non-technical,” the basics of radio system architecture are reviewed, before shifting the 
focus to the main points: unique challenges present in emergency environments, 
physiological limitations experienced by people under stress, and practical work-arounds 



























II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
A. CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
Throughout the research for this thesis, a common factor emerged—better 
definition of the issue and more enlightened approaches for emergency scene 
communications are needed. Although examples of the need for better communication 
were easily found, the specific “interoperability” problem was generally ill-defined and 
the term was misapplied to include non-technical challenges. While the solution to 
emergency scene communication generally equates to a technical treatment of “how-to” 
patch one system to another, the larger question remains: What behavioral components 
(i.e. procedures, training) are required as a necessary adjunct to hardware interoperability 
communications solutions? Since the collective conscience of those within the homeland 
security discipline is still being developed, emergency scene communications issues 
represents something of a “moving target.” The experiences of Hurricane Katrina are 
starting to produce additional lessons learned. In both man-made and natural disasters, it 
can be anticipated that the infrastructure itself will be damaged, by whatever catastrophic 
event has occurred, plus communications will be limited by the amount of radio traffic 
squeezed onto whatever radio spectrum remains operational. One hospital in Gulfport, 
Mississippi thought they had adequately prepared for communications contingencies 
before Hurricane Katrina, with back-up equipment—including satellite telephones and 
short-wave radios—yet the dish on the roof and towers they relied upon were damaged 
by the hurricane-force winds.21 
The predictable outcome has occurred once again: universal reports of 
communications inefficiency. Putting aside the fact that some of the infrastructure blew 
away, along with everything around it, there are several stories from areas on the fringe, 
where the infrastructure was operational, but it was the amount of radio traffic and 
manner in which personnel used the system that led to the negative outcome. 
 
                                                 
21 The News-Sentinel, “Communications a Weak Spot in Hospitals’ Disaster Preparedness,” Fort 
Wayne, IN, October 16, 2005. 
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B. SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
One major school of thought that can’t be ignored is the “school of denial!” Many 
in the first responder community do not acknowledge that there is an issue to be 
addressed. While failed communication is bemoaned as an after-action frustration, few 
are looking inward for solutions.  
We have heard the phrase “failure of imagination” used in the 9/11 commission 
report and now it is starting to surface regarding the Hurricane Katrina response.22 
Insomuch as homeland security and defense is focused on the intentional acts of persons 
bent upon causing harm to us, we are starting to see a melding of homeland security and 
defense with the broader discipline of “emergency management,” in recognition of the 
value of pursuing force multipliers consistent with an “all hazards” approach. We do not 
have a very good track record of anticipating situations and circumstances, before a 
calamity occurs. Policy makers seem content to form a defense against the kinds of 
situations recently experienced, rather than enthusiastically contemplating a full range of 
unusual events, including both those that are manmade and those occurring naturally, that 
can impact any given jurisdiction. It is a natural inclination that we therefore do not 
contemplate operational subsets, like communications support, if we deny the possibility 
of the entire situation occurring in the first place. Not many people even know they need 
to fix communications procedures used for inter-agency coordination. General agreement 
on the existence of a problem is not yet prevalent, but should be anticipated eventually as 
trial and error with radio patching equipment leads to unexpected radio system 
congestion and resultant ineffective communication. If nothing else, the amount of 
money expended on interoperability is going to attract scrutiny if we still label 
communications failure as our most frequent post-incident concern, despite deployment 




                                                 
22 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, 339. 
Evan Thomas, “How Bush Blew It, Bureaucratic timidity. Bad phone lines. And a failure of 
imagination. Why the government was so slow to respond to catastrophe,” Newsweek, September 19, 2005. 
 
11 
C. DIVERGENCE POINTS: CONVERGENCE OPPORTUNITIES 
Of those who do agree on the presence of an issue, commonality can be found in 
approaches involving common governance and procedural dictates.23 To some degree, 
recognition that communication procedures need to be changed may grow out of the 
NIMS mandate. NIMS is poised to force a solution, via funding control, ostensibly 
because agencies have failed, in the absence of external pressure, to identify the need and 
craft a viable solution. This is an interesting counterpoint to the common phrase that the 
government wants to craft “national solutions” for homeland security, but not “federal” 
ones, since NIMS has become a de facto, unfunded federal mandate. Hurricane Katrina 
has hastened further calls for federalized solutions. Our window of opportunity, to devise 
solutions of our own design, as a first responder community, is slowly closing. Since we 
have failed to collectively see the need and act to reverse years of parochial, myopic 
procedures and customs, we can anticipate more mandates by those distanced from the 
realities of working in the field.  
There is general agreement on the need to improve emergency scene 
communications.24 If, as predicted, the technical solutions to improve interoperability 
don’t have the desired affect (emergency scene communications enhancement), we 
should be ready to shift focus to the necessary procedural modification. The timetable of 
such realization and implementation of procedural enhancements and policy deployment 
remains to be seen, but the solutions will likely be similar, with only minor stylistic 
differences in approach, in deference to regional needs and nuances. 
 
D. MANDATE NOT AN AUTOMATIC SOLUTION 
In reviewing the early warning beacons on interoperability implementation 
concerns, some common threads are evident in the establishment of written procedures. 
Despite the para-militaristic format of the first responder community, who are generally 
bound by written rules and Standard Operating Procedures, immediate improvement of 
                                                 
23 National Task Force on Interoperability, “Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together To Bridge the 
Communications Gap To Save Lives. A Guide for Public Officials,” February 2003. 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitybasics/1159_nationaltask.htm. 
(Accessed October 28, 2005). 
24 Harlin R. McEwen, “Special Focus: Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable COMmunications: 
Safecom,” Police Chief Magazine, April 2004. 
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performance can be challenging since all organizations, (some much more than others), 
have rules on the books that are slow to become accepted into practice. Procedural 
changes, such as new ways of operating, involve more of a “corporate cultural” change, 
as opposed to simply developing new dictates, and expecting to see an immediate result. 
An example of such reticence to change, even in the face of logic, is seatbelt use by 
police and fire personnel. One recent study showed about 20% of the police officers 
seriously injured in traffic accidents were not wearing seatbelts.25 So paradoxically, 
merely legislating something to public safety officials will not guarantee compliance. 
Military partners have expressed surprise at the non-standard format of first responder 
service delivery and the jurisdiction-specific autonomy to make rules and unevenly 
enforce them. 
The cultures within the first responder community are unique. Common features, 
such as resistance to change, an “us-against-them” mentality, defense mechanisms from 
constant exposure to crisis, a tendency to have limited external interests and contacts, 
combined with a mentality of heroic entitlement to bend rules and receive special 
treatment creates considerable challenges when attempting to implement change.26 
Acknowledgement of the “first-responder mentality” will be necessary since we need to 
craft new rules for people with a high degree of resistance to change, and established 
comfort zones closely associated with personal convenience and safety.  
 
E. WHAT TO CALL IT? 
This thesis topic presents the opportunity to be among the first to synthesize 
analogous information bridging what other disciplines have learned about human 
tendencies exhibited while communicating under stress. One of the interesting challenges 
entails what to call this procedural and behavioral subset of first responder 
communications functionality. First responders have all heard of “interoperable 
communications,” but what do you call it when we are referencing the non-technical 
                                                 
25 Jehle Dietrich von Kuenssberg, MD, David G. Wagner, James Mayrose, Ph.D., Usman Hashmi, 
“Seat Belt Use By Police: Should They Click It?” Journal of Trauma-Injury Infection & Critical Care 58, 
no.1 (January 2005):119-120. 
26 Daniel A. Goldfarb, Ph.D., Gary S. Aumiller, Ph.D., “10 Reasons Cops are Different,” 
www.heavybadge.com. (Accessed August 23, 2005). 
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impediments to adequate emergency scene communications? “Crisis Communications” is 
one term that may fit, yet that has a larger connotation in the private sector referring to 
media relations in high profile situations like corporate take-overs, product tampering, or 
internal financial scandals. In the public sector, the term is used with Public Information 
functions to refer to the process of communicating with the public through the media. 
Nothing else quite rolls off the tongue yet; the predicament of what to call such non-
technical communications competence is likely to find its own level ground as new 
agencies within the Department of Homeland Security are created to address training and 
develop the associated standard operating procedures for communications.  
The press release shown below, issued September 27, 2004, by the Department of 
Homeland Security, is a good example of the vagueness we’ve seen thus far.  
Today, Secretary Ridge formally unveiled the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Interoperability and Compatibility that will strengthen 
the national partnership of local, state, and federal leadership to achieve 
emergency response interoperability in every community in the country. 
This new office, part of the Science & Technology directorate, will also 
expand the Department’s interoperability efforts beyond communications 
to include equipment, training, and others areas of need as required. The 
office will incorporate all Homeland Security interoperability 
programming, leveraging existing efforts to ensure better coordination and 
accountability for federal government activities relating to research and 
development, testing and evaluation, standards, technical assistance, 
training, and grant funding for interoperability.27 
The next step is to transition beyond such vagueness, by addressing specific 
procedures necessary to derive maximum benefit from the new equipment being 
deployed for homeland security communications improvement. Communications 
procedures should include teaching ways to economize use of communications assets, by 
placing priority on life-safety radio transmissions and practical alternatives for 
communicating during emergencies. Improved procedures should address application of 
NIMS incident management principles that emphasize the use of staging areas, sector 
                                                 
27 U.S. Dept of Homeland Security, Press Release: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Launches 
Office of Interoperability and Compatibility; Offers States and Locales Tools for Improving Public Safety 
Communications Interoperability, September 27, 2004. 
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control by assigning functional units under the control of a sector officer, and application 
of face-to-face communications practices.28 
 
F. RADIO SYSTEM 101 
The focus of this thesis is particularly intended for first responders and associated 
policy makers, who typically possess only a rudimentary understanding of radio system 
architecture. The following brief discussion of radio system infrastructure principles will 
provide a baseline understanding for the reader. 
Since the proliferation of cellular telephones during the last few years, average 
citizens have had the opportunity to experience the inherent limitations of relying on a 
portable radio device. People using cell phones consider them to be a close cousin to 
corded telephones in homes and businesses, and while the net effect is similar most of the 
time (a call is successfully completed), there are periods of limited and lost service and 
the audio consistency and quality are decidedly second-rate. Experienced users of cell 
phones can relate to dropped calls, garbled audio, inability to access the system due to 
remoteness or traffic load on the network, and dead batteries. Public safety first 
responders experience many of the same things as they use their radio equipment. 
Much like the networks built to support cellular telephones, public safety radio 
networks utilize a radio infrastructure, usually antennas placed on towers, with 
transmitters and receivers at the base, often interconnected in some manner to enable use 
of portable radio devices within the area served. Each jurisdiction makes a policy 
decision on the level of radio coverage they wish to pursue (and fund). “Most public 
safety specifications require a 95% level of coverage. The last few percentage points of 
coverage can drive up the cost of a system exponentially unless there is a cost-effective 
alternative to traditional tower sites.”29 
In radio circles, there is theoretically no such thing as 100% coverage since the 
vendor cannot control all of the influences that may hamper a specific radio device from 
                                                 
28 Jonathan S. Smith, “Work Channel: A Practical Guide to Improved Radio Communication, A 
Guide for Public Officials,” 9-1-1 Magazine, July/August 1997. 




working at a given location.30 Coverage inside buildings is especially problematic since 
adequate system coverage can be present in the street, outside, yet the deeper the first 
responders get into the building, the less likely it becomes that their radio will operate at 
peak efficiency. Some agencies have successfully deployed portable repeater equipment, 
but it takes considerable resources, dedicated to the purpose, just to provide this support 
function in the right place, at the right time. Such an arrangement is beyond the 
capabilities of many jurisdictions. It is possible to permanently install signal booster 
equipment within significant structures, yet cost, jurisdictional and technical barriers 
make this an inconsistent solution. 
Beyond the specifications and technical capability of a given system, the portable 
devices, by their very nature and purpose, are remote from the home system and can find 
themselves contending with other interference-producing influences, such as other radio 
systems (public safety and commercial), interference produced by other technologies, 
including industry and consumer products intended for other purposes, plus just the 
general limitation of high-tech hardware operating in harsh environments, e.g. fires, 
crimes, weather extremes, etc.  
These realities have not modified expectations by the end users or policy makers. 
If anything, the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on interoperability equipment shows 
we have collectively placed the emphasis on using radio devices at catastrophic incidents 
as the primary means of providing crew safety, efficient delivery of life-saving services 
and overall situational awareness for senior management.31 Few of us would place our 
lives in the balance based on the continued operation of our cell phones being ready to 
deliver every word to us, yet that is exactly what first responders do with the radios 
provided to them. For most first responders, their portable radio is their most frequently 
used piece of equipment. 
1. Radio System Limitations 
All radio devices operate within the radio frequency spectrum, controlled by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Some devices used around the home, such 
                                                 
30 Ibid: “There is no such thing as 100% coverage, and anyone who tells you different is suspect.” 
31 Jennifer C. Kerr, “Lack of Interoperability Hampers Agencies,” Associated Press, October 16, 
2005, http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/1005/269201.html. (Accessed December 12, 2005). 
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as garage door openers, wi-fi networks, walkie-talkies, and many remote control devices, 
operate at such low power levels, licenses are not necessary and there is little chance of 
conflicting with other units. Once a device needs to communicate at a greater distance, it 
is necessary to operate at higher power levels, requiring FCC control. The number of 
radio frequencies available for public safety use is limited. While efforts are underway to 
reallocate more frequencies to expand capabilities, the reality in most areas is first 
responders will continue to operate within a limited set of frequencies, for the foreseeable 
future. As such, radio spectrum is a limited commodity, in that there is a limit to the 
amount available for any given jurisdiction to use. Even where extra frequencies are 
available, the cost of hardware and infrastructure improvements provides practical 
financial limitation to many agencies. 
Returning to the cellular telephone analogy, there is a similar limit on the number 
of radio frequencies utilized at a specific cell phone tower, as well as a limit on the 
number of telephone lines able to be accessed on the switched telephone network. The 
cellular telephone service provider may hold thousands of frequency licenses nationwide, 
but deploys only a handful at each tower site. The limitation of the phone network to 
handle calls varies from area to area, and is not well advertised or acknowledged by the 
telephone carriers. Much like the practical limitations on public safety radio systems, 
telephone networks are not sized for even half of all users to talk simultaneously. 
2. Typical Trunked Radio System Configuration 
Even if it were possible to assign many more frequencies to an incident, assigning 
too many is a very real possibility since the addition of each new talkgroup (trucked 
systems) or dedicated channels (conventional systems) disperses potentially critical 
communications over a wide group of segmented audiences.32 This has the potential to 
cause: 
                                                 
32 Trunked Radio System: A system that integrates multiple channel pairs into a single system. When 
a user wants to transmit a message, the trunked system automatically selects a currently unused channel 
pair and assigns it to the user, decreasing the probability of having to wait for a free channel for a given 
channel loading. Conventional Radio System: Non-trunked, similar to telephone party-line in that the user 
determines availability by listening for an open channel. Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., report for the Public 
Safety Wireless Network (PSWN), Comparisons of Conventional and Trunked Systems, May 1999. 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F04A685D-5902-4655-BBBB-




1. a loss of adequate situational awareness development, for the responders 
at the scene, as well as support personnel monitoring the incident from a 
distance. Such personnel are dependent upon what they hear to form an 
adequate operational picture. If a key element is missed because it is said 
on an unmonitored frequency, the “missing piece of the puzzle” may 
distort the true picture of what is occurring. 
2. operational confusion due to sensory overload from so much being said 
simultaneously. Like the proverbial “tower of babble,” key points can 
become lost in multiple conversations occurring at the same time.  
3. safety concerns of someone calling for help on a channel beyond 
dispatcher or incident commander monitoring capability. First responder 
personnel rely on portable radios as their lifeline for assistance if they 
become trapped or disoriented. Calls for help may go unmonitored by 




Figure 1.   Radio System Traffic Analogy. 
 
Similar to lanes of traffic on a highway, there is a limit to the number of radio 
channels with simultaneous conversations that can be supported. During peak loading, a 
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conversation is interspersed among many other conversations. In trunked systems, a busy 
signal is produced when no communications path is available. Those using conventional 
systems will “cover” one another if too many people talk at once, which significantly 
reduces the effectiveness of those present at the emergency to communicate. 
As depicted in figure 1, radio system traffic is analogous to automobile traffic on 
the freeway—where there is a limit to the number of vehicles that can be handled with a 
given number of lanes. Interoperability equipment potentially merges additional “lanes of 
traffic” onto the same “highway,” theoretically producing greater tie-ups, not less. 
 
G. EMERGENCY SCENE CHALLENGES 
There is a tendency by policy makers isolated from emergency scene experiences 
to minimize the difficulties encountered by those responding to an emergency and to 
attempt to draw strategies from the literature on organizational theory and contemporary 
management techniques. The uninitiated may mistakenly assume that emergency scene 
decision making is similar to bureaucratic policy development, in which the luxury of 
time often allows for an exhaustive examination of alternatives, before selecting a course 
of action. 
First responders are placed in a very unique and precarious environment upon 
arrival at an emergency. Everything must be done in a time-compressed environment, 
with commitment to strategic decisions made in near-instantaneous fashion. Many of the 
commitments made in the early stages of the incident, regarding considerations such as 
the placement of personnel and equipment, calling for additional help, and the decision of 
where to concentrate efforts will largely influence the range of options available to 
incident commanders for the remainder of the incident. The first 20 minutes of a major 
incident are crucial to rescuing “savable” victims, removal of people from danger, and 
setting the organizational structure for the hours and perhaps days to follow. 
It is important for policy makers to appreciate that portable public safety radios 
issued to first responders are a critical lifeline used in meeting routine issues of personal 
safety and operational efficiency. The portable public safety radio is the first responders’ 
primary means to: 
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• develop situational awareness,  
• receive task assignments, and  
• attend to issues of life safety (public and personal). 
 
It is also important to the wider audience now entering the interoperability debate 
to fully appreciate that despite characterizations on television and movies, first 
responders are involved in true life-and-death situations a very small portion of the total 
time on duty. Also, their functioning in multi-jurisdictional/multi-unit environments is 
relatively rare in contrast to the overall workload. In essence, the average police officer 
works solo, and perhaps interacts with one or two fellow officers as back-ups, a handful 
of times per shift or work week. Similarly, the typical firefighter is part of a two-to-four-
person team, occasionally deployed with several similar work units to major incidents. As 
such, the experience base, and anticipatory psyche is that the risks and stressors will be 
low to moderate, and the radio traffic will be similarly low to moderate, on the typical 
work day. This reality works counter to good habit development and appropriate 
anticipation of efficient and effective communications skills and tactics, during intense, 
high-risk, cataclysmic events, since they occupy what may be less than one percent of all 
their time on duty, during the span of an entire career. 
This tells us that the daily routine of first responders does little to prepare the 
average first responder to face a communications-intense environment, typical of large-
scale disasters. Yet the universal reaction by response personnel at after-action reviews 
has been shock and indignation over failed communications at disaster scenes. We must 
remain mindful that the net results are a product of a process whereby the daily radio 
practices are accelerated and multiplied, with a dramatic increase in communications by 
the responders at an incident, and these communications are squeezed into limited 
communications systems. Large-scale emergencies challenge the emergency community 
to find new ways to prepare personnel for situations which will be uncomfortable, 
unfamiliar, and counter-intuitive. While there are things that can be done to stretch the 
communications resources deployed at emergency scenes, the logical approach is to 




1. Criteria to Judge Outcomes  
Rather than lumping all communications issues into one category, it is useful to 
determine an agreed-upon system of communications issues sub categories to itemize and 
describe the types of issues encountered at a given incident or exercise. These issues may 
include: 
• Radio system coverage 
• Human interface with the technology 
• “Airtime” – ability to access a system to deliver a message 
• Need to talk to a responder from another agency at the same incident 
• Stress-influenced ineffective message delivery 
• Non-standard terminology 
• Failure to minimize radio traffic to only essential communications 
 
This provides a foundation of understanding, based upon broad categories, rather 
than the heretofore over simplification of “communications were bad,” therefore, 




III. PERTINENT PARALLELS FROM OTHER SECTORS 
The biggest frontier for the first responder community, in terms of efforts targeted 
at improving communications, will be to examine the body of knowledge in the 
behavioral sciences and apply it to improve the operational efficiency of first responders 
engaged in homeland security.  
Work has been done for decades to study and predict how people will react in a 
variety of situations. As such, there are pertinent analogies to the world of emergency 
services, providing that they are appropriately vetted for applicability to the unique 
culture and realities of those delivering emergency services in our communities. 
 
A. MILITARY 
Students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) are ideally positioned to glean 
information from classmates, faculty and NPS resources on how the U.S. military 
communicates during operations. Throughout their course of study, community first 
responders have had the opportunity to compare notes with experienced military 
personnel. A number of analogies can be drawn, to answer the question at hand—how 
can community first responders communicate in a more effective manner? 
The U.S. Navy has undertaken significant efforts to better understand how their 
personnel react under stressful communications situations. “Two incidents in the 1980s 
highlighted the need for improvements: The USS Stark was attacked by two Exocet anti-
ship missiles and was nearly sunk, and the USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down a 
civilian Iranian airliner during a surface battle with Iranian naval forces.”33 
1. Vincennes  
The 1988 downing of a commercial airliner by the USS Vincennes offers insight 
into the challenges of making time-compressed decisions, based upon monitoring of 
                                                 
33 Lt. Sharif H. Calfee, U.S. Navy, and Neil C. Rowe, Institute for Modeling, Virtual Environments, 
and Simulation (MOVES) and Computer Science Department, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Multi-
Agent Simulation of Human Behavior in Naval Air Defense, 
http://www.cs.nps.navy.mil/people/faculty/rowe/calfeepap.htm. (Accessed September 11, 2005). 
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decision support system displays, while lives hang in the balance. In one of the most 
studied events involving people using technology to glean information and make 
decisions, a number of vulnerabilities and shortcomings were identified, despite the 
availability/use of significant technological assets, which represented the state of the art 
at that time. 
“On 3 July 1988, the USS Vincennes …, operating in the Southern Persian Gulf 
as a unit assigned to Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, downed a civilian 
airliner, Iran Air Flight 655 on a routine scheduled flight from Bandar Abbas to Dubai, 
with two SM-2 [missiles].”34 The 290 civilians on board the plane were killed following 
the execution of orders to shoot the plane down when it appeared to be hostile. The 
Fogarty report delineates how the order to shoot followed a series of warnings, 
coincidences of timing, and earlier hostile acts by enemy aircraft in the area. 
2. Post-Vincennes Introspection 
In the years following the USS Vincennes incident, the U.S. Navy searched for 
greater insight into the question of how people react in high-stress environments and 
what can be done to improve the quality of decisions made under such circumstances. 
To develop answers and solutions to these challenges, the Tactical Decision 
Making Under Stress (TADMUS) program was initiated in 1990, with the goal of 
designing a decision support system (DSS) based on, “(a) an understanding of the 
cognitive strategies people use when dealing with the types of decisions required in 
tactical decision making and (b) incorporating human-computer interface design 




                                                 
34 W. M. Fogarty, Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of a 
Commercial Airliner by the U.S.S. Vincennes (CG49) on 3 July 1988 (letter to Commander in Chief, U.S. 
Central Command), Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 1988. 
35 Susan G. Hutchins, “Decision making errors demonstrated by experienced naval offices in a littoral 




Teams of command-level antiair warfare personnel were brought into a simulator 
environment, and engaged in a series of scenarios (which were praised for their realism), 
while researchers recorded the decisions made by the personnel, for later scoring and 
analysis.36 
Performance was improved when decision support, in the form of a user-centered 
decision support system (DSS) was provided to the decision makers. Situational 
awareness was enhanced by improving the visual displays provided. The DSS had 
modules to help keep track of actions taken, or awaiting attention, as opposed to the 
traditional expectation of the individual relying upon memory to remember which tasks 
need to be performed and when.37 Other modules synthesized parametric data and 
provided graphic presentations to depict what tracked aircraft were doing along with 
recommended actions to be taken. The sheer volume of information flowing in a 
compressed timeframe produces a high cognitive workload environment, one that 
acknowledges that short-term memory degrades under stress, further limiting the 
cognitive capabilities of the individual.38  
Reliance on memory is the way many first responder agencies have historically 
operated, with informal policies and traditional customs and “rules of thumb” being more 
the operational norm than any formal, standardized approach. Commanders of first 
responding agencies have resisted use of written checklists and marker boards, partly 
because of logistical issues (weather, pace of the emergency, and they are more 
cumbersome) and partly because it represents a departure from the historic methodology 
handed down from one generation of responder to the next. Peer pressure and resistance 
to change produce less than enthusiastic adoption of alternate methods, yet the TADMUS  
 
                                                 
36 Susan G. Hutchins, “Decision making errors demonstrated by experienced naval offices in a littoral 
environment, in C. E. Zsambok and G. Klein, Naturalistic Decision Making (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1997), 
207-215. 
37 DSS modules were designed to support the decision maker by reducing the number of items they 
had to remember (by displaying all pertinent data regarding the situation), and aiding their attention 
allocation process by prompting them on which actions needed to be taken and which tracks (aircraft) 
required their attention. 
38 Susan G. Hutchins (Research Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School), Interview with 
author, July 22, 2005, Monterey, CA. Situational Awareness was enhanced by providing visible displays 
that facilitated the decision maker’s ability to rapidly understand what a track is doing.. 
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program documents the value of using a well-designed visual display instead of relying 
on memory to recall important tactical information and to keep track of actions taken and 
actions still pending. 
Other Navy findings, pertinent to the first responder community, involve 
recognizing the inefficiency of expecting people to recall vast amounts of information 
from training and experience, plus the effects of “cognitive biases.”39 Several researchers 
have documented the susceptibility of decision makers to cognitive biases when 
operating under stress, i.e., high workload, time pressure, information ambiguity. 
Decision makers are also susceptible to cognitive “tunnel vision,” a situation where they 
focus on a narrow set of cues when under stress, even to the exclusion of critical matters 
awaiting attention. Another example of commonality between military and first responder 
decision making is the condition of decision confirmation bias—commanders tend to 
build upon assumptions made earlier in the decision sequence, even if they were based 
upon limited or even erroneous assumptions. 
The incident commanders in New York City on 9/11 were faced with limitations 
on their field of view (among tall buildings) and perhaps a degree of cognitive bias, based 
on their response to the same complex of buildings for a lesser attack in 1993.40 It is 
during such periods of limited field of view when reliance on communications systems 
for development of an accurate operational picture is most acute. 
 
B. FIRST RESPONDER OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
The average incident commander at the scene of a community emergency 
generally starts out with little more than a portable radio, and perhaps a clipboard of some 
sort. The largest first responder departments in the country may deploy drivers and aides 
                                                 
39 “A cognitive bias is a tendency to mentally process information in a particular way…people tend to 
seek out information that confirms their preconceptions and to discount information that disconfirms their 
preconceptions.” Jeffrey P. Richer, Ph.D., Scottsdale (AZ) Community College, Unpublished curriculum, 
http://www.sc.maricopa.edu/sbscience/ psy266/lessons/essays/essay9.html. (Accessed October 28, 2005). 
40 “People watching on TV certainly had more knowledge of what was happening a hundred floors 
above us than we did in the lobby. Certainly without any information, without critical information coming 
in, the cumulative effect of the information coming in, it’s very difficult to make informed critical decisions 
without that information. And it didn’t exist that day. Our communication systems were down.” Peter 




with command officers, but they are the exception of all emergency responses made 
nationwide. Eventually, command assistance, support, and technology are usually 
deployed on-scene, as an incident escalates, but the variance in capabilities to fund, staff, 
configure and operate under pressure vary greatly, nationwide. While the level of support 
eventually brought in to a large-scale disaster assists the overall response and recovery 
phases, it is during the first few minutes of a disaster when the incident commander is 
responsible for a wide array of critical duties: 
• proper size-up of the event, (used in first responder circles to mean the 
initial assessment regarding the scope and magnitude of the incident) 
• establishment of safety zones and warning those in the path of the hazard 
• protection of any potential crime scene 
• calling for additional resources 
• coordinating the initial response, optimized for rescue of “savable” lives 
 
Research indicates teams who exhibit strong communications skills (“high 
performing teams”) were found to have, “a clear sense of roles and expectations, greater 
team productivity, enhanced collaboration and problem solving, improved working 
relationships, greater job satisfaction, fewer destructive conflicts and a sense of personal 
achievement.”41 
First responders frustrated by poor communications are at a disadvantage since 
they are at the point of greatest need when they are dealing with a crisis. Responders 
typically are concentrating on calling for, and coordinating the use of, unusual resources 
needed to respond to the crisis situation. At the very time they need optimal facilitated 
collaboration, due to the challenges present at most disaster scenes, e.g. role confusion, 
high emotions, and tenacious relationships history, the elevated personal conflicts 
associated with poor communications will tend to pull them in the opposite direction 
from the necessary teamwork and collaboration. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Melanie Becker, James Burns-Howell, John Kyriakides, Derek Smith, “IS Team Effectiveness 
Factors and Performance,” Department of Information Systems, University of Cape Town, South Africa, 
1997. http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/informationsystems/Research&Publications/Pubs2000/ER05.pdf. 
(Accessed November 8, 2005). 
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C. ALTERNATIVES: TEXT, VISUAL DISPLAYS, NEW TECHNOLOGY 
1. Remote Control Aircraft  
Military planners envision a future whereby Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
will fill the sky and conduct missions ranging broadly from defense to commercial 
interests, both foreign and domestic.42 There will be an acute need to optimize the remote 
control of such aircraft, so that manned aircraft are not interfered with, people on the 
ground are protected from danger, and aircraft itself is preserved from crash landing. 
Something as simple as the perception and proper reaction to turbulence becomes 
reflexive to a human pilot, but will demand elaborate provisions to handle remotely. 
Economy of scale pressures will also invite the notion of one operator flying multiple 
aircraft. How much is too much and what can be done to optimize the visual displays 
used by the remote pilots? Those questions are just starting to be researched, but 
preliminary indications point toward the need for better, intuitive design of visual 
displays, before even a one-for-one remote pilot configuration becomes practical over the 
common practice of two-person ground crews- “one responsible for airframe control and 
the other for payload sensor control. Such crew structure is merited in light of findings 
that the assignment of airframe and payload control to a single operator with 
conventional UAV displays can substantially degrade performance.”43 
The value of this preliminary research for first responders is twofold: 
1. It validates that the human interface with technology is not all it can be, 
and if users depend on display of data, as a substitute for radio 
transmissions, it will have to be displayed in such a way as to be useful to 
the person operating under pressure. In other words, the mere presence of 
the information, somewhere on the screen, does not guarantee operational 
value. 
2. As further research develops for optimizing operator information displays 
for UAVs, the first responder community should monitor the findings. The 
opportunity exists to identify, modify and adopt them to the multi-sensory 
challenges present for communications operators and incident 
commanders at the scene of emergencies. 
                                                 
42 Jason S. McCarley, and Christopher D. Wickens, “Human Factors Concerns in UAV Flight,” 
Institute of Aviation, Aviation Human Factors Division, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. (Dr. 
William K. Krebs, Office of the Chief Scientist for Human Factors, General Aviation Human Factors, 
Federal Aviation Administration), 2004, 24-28.  
43 Ibid., with citation from L. Van Breda, Operator Performance in Multi Maritime Unmanned Air 
Vehicle Control (Soesterberg, The Netherlands: TNO Human Factors Research Institute, 1995), 27. 
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2. Headset Design 
Battle management command and control (BMC2) as performed by 
operators of tactical air battle management platforms such as the U.S. Air 
Force’s E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) or E-8 Joint 
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), or the U.S. Navy’s 
E-2C Hawkeye, is a communications-intensive activity. Weapons 
directors and mission crew commanders on these platforms are required to 
monitor as many as eight simultaneous communications channels against a 
background of moderate to high ambient cabin noise while performing a 
number of visual and manual tasks, the combination of which in the heat 
of battle is challenging even for the most highly trained operators. 
Researchers at the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Human Effectiveness 
Directorate have been investigating two technologies that may ameliorate 
this problem: active noise reduction headsets and spatial intercoms.44 
While it may be impractical for the “first” of the first responders to operate with 
headphones, it’s apparent that headphones should be considered for people detailed for 
communications support at the scene of emergencies. This notion challenges the status 
quo of how first responders communicate over radios, i.e., generally on a portable radio 
with some form of open speaker, and it indicates a need to reexamine the equipment 
itself.  
Bolia, et al., examined the benefit of technologically modified headphones, in 
which the illusion of spatial separation is accomplished via digital technology. This helps 
because of a phenomena known as the “cocktail party effect,” “which refers to the fact 
that, at a cocktail party, in the midst of perhaps scores of people engaged in dozens of 
conversations, an individual can still make sense of what the person she is talking to is 
trying to say, despite the fact that if the same conversations were played (simultaneously) 
to the individual over mono headphones she would be hopelessly lost.”45 The effect 
created for the listener using such headsets is depicted in Figure 2, showing the study’s 
demonstrated value of providing separation in the communications sources. 
                                                 
44 Robert S. Bolia, W. Todd Nelson, Michael A. Vidulich, Brian D. Simpson, and Douglas S. 
Brungart, Communications Research for Command & Control: Human-Machine Interface Technologies 
Supporting Effective Air Battle Management, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force 
Base, OH. http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2005/10th/CD/papers/279.pdf . (Accessed November 10, 2005). 
45 E. C. Cherry, “Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, With One and With Two Ears,” 




Figure 2.   Spatial vs. Diotic Audio Sources (From E. C. Cherry, “Some Experiments on the 
Recognition of Speech, With One and With Two Ears,” Journal of the Acoustical Society 
of America 25 (1953): 975-979) 
 
Audio comparison of overall performance with spatial-audio and diotic-audio 
displays (shown on the left of the figure) was compared in a multi-talker listening task 
with all male talkers. The results (shown on the right) have been plotted as a function of 
the number of talkers in the trial. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals for 
each data point.46 
Results of this study suggest that first responders should anticipate that listening 
to multiple channels at the same incident will be difficult, and if attempted, equipment 
modifications should be developed. 
 
D. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
1. Emotional Component  
There are some basic, predictable human responses, especially those associated 
with our physiological programming, such as the “fight or flight” response, which are 
                                                 
46 Bolia, Nelson, et al., Communications Research, 7. 
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involuntary and common across all people.47 Consider the emotion in the voice of the 
radio announcer in the famous recording of the Hindenburg disaster (“oh, the 
humanity…”).48 The emotion is very similar to that of emergency personnel transmitting 
at the scene of an emergency today, therefore valid and valuable analogies exist in the 
research literature.49 
2. Physiological Influences 
A lot is going through the head of an incident commander at the scene of an 
emergency. The amount of sensory input the brain has to process is immense. Just the 
process of responding to the emergency takes a toll on the individual, considering that the 
address must be recognized, an appropriate access route selected, traffic to be 
maneuvered through (especially with lights and sirens), and attempts to develop a mental 
picture of what is occurring, based on updates received en route. First responders may 
arrive in an emotionally compromised state, as contrasted with those working in stable 
environments, before they are even called upon to perform critical decision making and 
clearly articulate commands to others. When asked to describe the process by which 
decisions were arrived at, a firefighter in one study indicated that he wasn’t even aware 
that he was making a decision; it was more of a reflexive reaction than a conscious 
contemplation of a range of options to be acted upon at a later date.50 This is sometimes 
referred to as intuitive decision making and it reflects that people who are experts in their 
domain are so highly experienced they react automatically without conscious thought. 
Another major influence inhibiting clear communication is a state of expressive 
suppression, defined as “consciously inhibiting emotional expressions while emotionally 
aroused.”51 First responders force themselves to “stay calm” and control the emotion in 
their voice. In one study, it was found that when people suppress natural emotional 
                                                 
47 W. B. Cannon, Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage: An account of recent research 
into the function of emotional excitement, (2nd edition) (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1929). 
48 Herbert Morrison, The Hindenburg Broadcast, May 6, 1937. 
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/vohind.htm. (Accessed October 15, 2005). 
49 Nancy J Rigg, “Maintaining Control, North Hollywood Bank Robbery & Shootout,” 9-1-1 
Magazine (February 28, 1997). 
50 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1998), 16. 
51 E. A. Butler, B. Egloff, F.H. Wilhelm, N. C. Smith, E. A. Erickson, and J. J. Gross, (2003). “The 
Social Consequences of Expressive Suppression,” Emotion 3: 48–67. 
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responses, the by-products are elevated blood pressure, increased stress levels, disrupted 
communications, reduction in rapport building and inhibited relationship formation.52 
These byproducts are hardly a recipe for articulate communications and collaborative 
resource deployment with other agencies!  
Another study with similar implications for first responders was one in which 
subjects were monitored for physiological changes while under stress.53 Given that first 
responders are called upon to perform critical thinking in a demanding environment, and 
that talking over a radio system, monitored by hundreds or thousands of people (over 
public radio channels monitored on scanning radios, and potentially over media outlets) 
is similar to giving a speech. Recognition of this situation gives us valuable insight into 
the physiological limitations placed on people speaking at emergency scenes. The study 
segmented the stressors placed upon the subject into two categories: a mental arithmetic 
task and a public speaking task. Those studied showed greater anxiety in giving a speech 
on short notice, than they did in performing a solo task of adding numbers in their head. 
A significant difference in all monitored bodily reactions was noted, including: 
1. Public speaking triggered higher levels of blood pressure and heart rate 
than mental arithmetic. 
2. Mental arithmetic initially changed from increased cardiac activity to a 
vascular pattern (the blood vessels adjusted to the increased demand for 
mental capacity) yet in the public speaking task, the elevated cardiac rate 
and vascular activation sustained throughout the task. 
3. The secretion of cortisol (a hormone regulating the body’s reaction to 
stress) rose significantly during both tasks, but the public speaking 
component caused the highest secretion. 
4. Physiological changes in body chemistry have been associated with 
negative mood, anxiety, anger, confusion, fatigue, and depression. This 
matched what the test subjects reported in post-experiment interviews. 
5. Significance was noted in the order of task performance: those who did the 
speech first, then the arithmetic fared better than those who still had 
deliverance of the speech on their minds. This is significant since 
emergency responders are similarly thinking through complex decision  
 
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 M. Al'Absi, S Bongard, T Buchanan, G. A. Pincomb, J. Licinio, W. R. Lovallo, “Cardiovascular 
and Neuroendocrine Adjustment to Public Speaking and Mental Arithmetic Stressors,” Psychophysiology 
(May 1997), 266-75. 
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matrixes, receiving input from a variety of sources, and contemplating 
what to say over the radio, for undetermined and often extended periods of 
time. 
The bottom-line for first responders attempting to control an incident is they will 
be operating from a position of deficit, at the very time they will need to collaborate with 
coworkers and subordinates in their own agency, and make the even bigger step toward 
bridging their efforts with other agencies. This will make efficient operation at the scene 
of that specific incident challenging, and in a larger context, the dysfunctional working 
relationships between agencies is likely to languish from month to month, year to year, 
based upon negative experiences where rapport was lost and trusts damaged during such 
periods of inhibited communications experiences. 
3. Individual Responsibilities 
We are likely on the front edge of a trend, during which we will continue to 
experience a number of communications failures, despite the addition of so much 
equipment, and we will then turn to a procedural focus based on individual competencies. 
As we quietly passed the tenth anniversary of the rescue of U.S. Air Force 
Captain Scott O’Grady, who was shot down over hostile territory in Bosnia, in 1995, we 
are reminded of the possibilities regarding better utilization of our communications 
assets, especially at a time of expanded homeland security missions.54 O’Grady 
coordinated his own rescue by hiding from the enemy for six days and by expertly using 
his portable radio. With technology integrated into many aspects of the first responders’ 
workplace, we have to remain mindful of the challenges present in becoming a proficient 
user. Rookie police officers and firefighters typically receive minimal or no training on 
the full and proper use of their radio equipment, yet it will become their most frequently 
used piece of equipment, one in which their personal well being and effectiveness to 
serve others will be key. Very few first responders would survive in the manner of Air 
Force Captain O’Grady if they were trapped and had to make their radio last for several 
days. 
Public safety radio users often are not able to do much more than turn the power 
on, adjust the volume, push to talk, and maybe change a few channels. We must be 
                                                 
54 Kevin Fedarko and Mark Thompson, “All For One,” Time, June 19, 1995. 
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mindful of a predictable level of “Blinking 12 syndrome,” in which people tend to use 
only a portion of a technology product’s capabilities (like the blinking, unset clock on 
home video equipment,) instead of reading instruction manuals and experimenting with 
seldom-used features.55 The challenge for the future will be to configure radios to be 
more intuitive to use, while providing more training (and a commensurate level of 
motivational self-interest,) to the field responders who will need to know how to use their 
radio as a life-safety device, and during infrequent circumstances, immediately recall 
how to change to another bank of channels. Most first responders use only a small portion 
of their portable radio’s capabilities— perhaps a primary dispatch channel and a few 
tactical, on-scene channels. Maneuvering to additional channel banks, where 
interoperability channels often reside, is a cumbersome process requiring the turning of 
knobs, and/or manipulation of buttons, pressed in precisely the proper sequence. Many 
radios also have features allowing access to alternate communications modes, yet that 
requires knowledge of relative advantages and disadvantages, and the aforementioned 
ability to reset the radio’s selector switches and buttons.56 
Manipulating portable radio settings is a difficult task to accomplish under ideal 
conditions; the chance of successful selection of a different channel bank is much more 
challenging under typically adverse operating conditions. Factors in the operational 
environment of first responders include: 
 
 
1. recalling seldom-used information under stress 
2. need to converse instantaneously and intuitively 
3. environmental factors, such as darkness, cold, rain, etc. 
4. protective equipment interfering with dexterity and clear speech (gloves and 
respirators) and  
5. need to pay full attention to critical factors, without focusing on equipment 
 
                                                 
55 “Blinking 12 Syndrome” is widely used in various forms in technology circles; first use 
undetermined. 
56 Such as “conventional,” “trunked,” and “repeater” modes; terms associated with how the hand piece 
accesses a radio system or other hand pieces. 
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4. Factors Influencing People Experiencing Stress 
People within the first responder community can readily identify with a 
phenomenon that occurs when someone is transmitting on a radio at the scene of a critical 
incident. The pitch and pace of the person’s voice typically and uniquely changes, 
signaling to the listener that something urgent is being described, regardless of whether 
the person’s voice is recognized, or associated with a particular individual. This condition 
accounts for the widespread practice of leaving public safety radios on throughout the 
workday, with the listener having no comprehension of specific content of routine 
transmissions, yet listeners will instantly be alerted if their radio number is called, and 
will especially divert their attention, if something critical is being transmitted.  
The best example for the layperson is the famous recording of the radio broadcast 
of the Hindenburg disaster.57 Although it was over 68 years ago, the voice of the 
announcer reporting the eyewitness account of the huge explosion of hydrogen gas as the 
occupied, gigantic German dirigible tried to land in New Jersey is a part of classic radio 
lore.58 Considering that the account was actually recorded for broadcast at a later time, 
(the announcer was from a Chicago radio station), helps to validate that it was a sincere 
and spontaneous recounting of the emotional event he was seeing, especially as his voice 
breaks-down while he delivers the classic line, “Oh, the humanity…” 
Another, more contemporary example was Walter Cronkite’s announcement of 
the assassination of President Kennedy, his voice cracking with emotion, as he removed 
                                                 
57 Herbert Morrison, The Hindenburg Broadcast, May 6, 1937. 
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/vohind.htm. (Accessed August 3, 2005). 
58 Hindenburg Radio Broadcast Transcript: "It burst into flames! Get out of the way! Get out of the 
way! It's fire and it's crashing! It's crashing terrible! Oh, my! Get out of the way, please! It's burning, 
bursting into flames and is falling on the mooring mast, and all the folks agree that this is terrible. This is 
the worst of the worst catastrophes in the world! Oh, it's crashing...oh, four or five hundred feet into the 
sky, and it's a terrific crash, ladies and gentlemen. There's smoke, and there's flames, now, and the frame is 
crashing to the ground, not quite to the mooring mast...Oh, the humanity, and all the passengers screaming 
around here!" "I told you...I can't even talk to people...around there. It's -- I can't talk, ladies and gentlemen. 
Honest, it's just laying there, a mass of smoking wreckage, and everybody can hardly breathe and talk...I, 
I'm sorry. Honest, I can hardly breathe. I'm going to step inside where I cannot see it. …. I -- Listen folks, 
I'm going to have to stop for a minute, because I've lost my voice...This is the worst thing I've ever 
witnessed..." http://www.hindenburg.net/index.htm. (Accessed October 23, 2005). 
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his reading glasses at the end of the message.59 Considering that Mr. Cronkite earned a 
prominent place in broadcast history using his voice, under circumstances of intense 
emotion (war zones, political conventions, and civil strife), it is noteworthy that the 
circumstances of the Kennedy assassination were overwhelming enough for Cronkite to 
momentarily lose control of his voice. Recognition of this phenomenon helps us to 
understand that emergency responders, even the most seasoned and experienced, may be 
handicapped by their own emotional responses at the scene of major crises. 
 
E. REALITIES FOR PEOPLE WORKING IN CRISIS SITUATIONS 
Once the influences affecting first responders are better understood and accepted, 
emergency trainers and planners are directed to several logical conclusions: 
• There will be factors beyond the control of those present at the scene that 
will impact their ability to use their radios in optimal ways. While training 
and experience can go a long way toward improving radio practices, 
intensely critical events, such as people severely injured, dying, awaiting 
rescue, or actively threatening others should be anticipated, along with the 
propensity of those involved to be impacted emotionally. While this is 
admittedly the proverbial “once in a career” occurrence, emotional 
handicap should be anticipated in dire command circumstances. 
• Radio communications during cataclysmic events will not be as expedient 
or helpful as during lesser emergencies. As described elsewhere in this 
thesis, people are creatures of habit. We revert to practiced behaviors in 
times of crisis. Consider that the average first responder is not from busy 
urban areas like New York or Los Angeles, or Chicago. Out of all of the 
thousands of responses made daily across the nation, relatively few are 
truly life and death situations, with lives hanging-in-the-balance, even in 
busy urban areas. The vast majority of situations are non-critical, in the 
eyes of the responder, (despite the citizen’s perception of crisis due to a 
stolen car, lost child, or amputated finger). 
• During these periods of routine operations, confidence is built-up in using 
the radio equipment. The user has generally clear air to intersperse 
conversations to coworkers and dispatchers, having needs met through 
casual or routine turns of speech between sender and receiver. With the 
prevailing light radio traffic and with normal emotional states, first 
                                                 
59 “The words stuck in my throat. A sob wanted to replace them. A gulp or two quashed the sob, 
which metamorphosed into tears forming in the corners of my eyes. I fought back the emotion and regained 
my professionalism, but it was touch and go there for a few seconds before I could continue.” [Sentiments 
of TV Anchorman Walter Cronkite as he announced the words: “From Dallas, Texas, the flash — 
apparently official. President Kennedy died at 1 p.m. central standard time — a half hour ago…”]. 
http://www.tvrundown.com/lostfilm.html. (Accessed on August 24, 2005). 
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responders are able to conduct efficient business conversations on a daily 
basis. Nothing in this pattern adequately prepares the user for crisis 
communications. During periods of high-volume, high-stress crisis 
situations, the user’s expectation and reliance upon good communication 
continues, but the increased pace and load on the radio system, combined 
with unique emotional influences present, tends to hamper, rather than 
facilitate, the process. Much like the general public’s expectations of cell 
phones continuing to meet their communications needs during peak 
calling periods, numerous post-disaster reports describe the common 
occurrence of cell phones (which are radio units interfaced to the public 
switched telephone network) failing when they are needed the most.60 
• Recording of radio channels and their playback during after-action 
reviews, legal proceedings, and to world-wide audiences on cable 
television has added additional pressure, increasing the level of “stage 
fright” a radio system user may feel (unlike those in the private sector and 
military, public safety radio conversations are subject to public release by 
open records and freedom of information laws). Much like the replay of a 
controversial judgment call at a sporting event, incident recordings are 
frequently replayed over and over and may even factor into promotional 
decisions and general formation of an opinion of “fitness for command,” 
which is a very fragile commodity in first responder circles.61 Despite 
more quantitative and objective measures of fitness for duty and command 
and the worthiness of being a leader, the traditional and persistent reality 
is reputations are earned not in the aggregate, during months and years of 
dedication and competence, but during fleeting moments of snap decisions 
and impressions created by remote monitoring of emergency scene radio 
transmissions. 
 
This is not to suggest that people will hesitate in a moment of crisis to vainly 
contemplate the personal gain that can be attained by sounding competent and in control, 
but it does suggest that radio transmissions, which are monitored by a large audience, are 
not as intuitive and spontaneous as a private telephone conversation. Given that a large 
percentage of the general public is apprehensive and fearful of delivering a speech to a 
large room of people, even with adequate notice and preparation, consider the challenge 
                                                 
60 “Some of the basic weaknesses exposed by September 11—and, one would have presumed, since 
fixed--seemed instead to linger. For example, police and other officials were unable to communicate as 
their cell phones failed and satellite phones took days to arrive:” “Unprepared,” Washington Post [Post-
Hurricane Katrina Editorial] September 5, 2005, A30. 
61 “Last fall, I listened to the initial attack radio conversations from a fire that ultimately burned 
significant timber acreage…” “The captain on the engine was at the scene but was hesitant to establish 
himself as the incident commander. He went so far as to ask the air attack officer orbiting above the fire to 
assume this role.” Michael S. Terwilliger, “Captain In Charge?” Fire Chief Magazine, April, 2003. 
http://firechief.com/news/firefighting_captain_charge/index.html. (Accessed on December 22, 2005). 
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inherent in verbalizing, (ideally in optimized, unambiguous syntax) a pattern of words 
containing specifics unknown just minutes prior, and you start to get an appreciation of 
the moment of hesitation radio users at the scene of disasters experience just prior to 







IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CLASSIC APPROACH 
A. METHODOLOGY 
Since true disaster-level emergencies happen so infrequently, it is important to 
utilize periodic exercises and careful evaluation to provide proof of concept. Outcomes 
can be measured during training exercises, to provide a valuable notion of areas needing 
improvement. As was described in Section III, the U.S. Military has made productive use 
of simulation training to improve the performance of crews operating under similarly 
stressful conditions. 
Metrics obtained through radio system loading data provide confirmation or 
counterpoint to anecdotal experiences reported by participants in routine training 
exercises. Decidedly less scientific, but nonetheless valuable, are comments gleaned from 
after-action reviews, during which communications issues are frequently delineated. 
Further opportunity to quantify improvement efforts can be accomplished by post-
incident transcript reviews, during which the effectiveness of communications can be 
rated. With a stated objective of emergency communications being the timely and 
effective delivery of a message, efficiencies in each speech turn (communication 
exchange) can be scored, based on specific criteria. Scoring criteria may include: 
successful message delivery, economy of wording to deliver the same content, and 
number of times a message went unacknowledged, or number of times it was necessary 
for a message to be repeated. A subjective assessment of the sender’s excitement level 
can also be assessed as a diagnostic tool to evaluate the impact on communications 
effectiveness. 
 
B.  NATIONWIDE CASE STUDIES 
1. New Hampshire  
In 1997, the New Hampshire State Police faced a rolling shooting rampage by a 
begrudged citizen with an assault rifle, resulting in the deaths of two law enforcement 
officers, a judge, and a newspaper editor. After he stole a police car, retrieved additional 
ammunition and altered his appearance, many agencies responded, including local, 
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county, state, and federal law officials.62 A series of radio communications failures were 
attributed to incompatible radio systems and failure of portable radios in fringe reception 
areas. However, one of the officers involved confirmed that having a working radio unit 
doesn’t guarantee effective communication in a crisis. “Trooper West, encountering 
problems with static and having difficulty raising the command post on his portable, ran 
back to the parked cruisers to attempt to use a cruiser radio. ‘There was so much (radio) 
traffic because of the police responding (to the scene) that I couldn’t get air time to talk to 
our dispatcher. So I gave up trying to communicate with anybody at [that] point.’”63  
This is a common complaint-- even though the radio system remained operational, 
the volume of radio traffic creates communications bottlenecks, leading to frequent, 
“couldn’t get on the air” comments. Radio discipline by all systems users, limiting 
conversations to those absolutely necessary, is a must, in the interest of operational 
efficiency. 
2. California  
The California Fire Service is renowned for their ability to handle large groups of 
responders mustered for their perennial wildland fires. One such fire in Southern 
California in 1993, resulted in the response of hundreds of pieces of fire equipment, 
manned by thousands of personnel.64 “Firefighters from other California communities, 
the U.S. Forest Service, local law enforcement and the California Highway Patrol, 
emergency medical service staff, the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Los 
Angeles County Parks and Recreation, utility companies, railroad and transportation 
representatives, civilian volunteers and the news media were all involved. L.A. County 
has two VHF channels that are used in tactical situations. Protocol calls for fire ground 
communications to switch to one of the VHF channels as soon as the first responders 
arrive on scene.65 This tactical radio channel can quickly become overloaded as the 
                                                 
62 Donald A. Lund, “The Lessons of Non-Interoperability in Public Safety Communication Systems, 
The ATLAS Project, Advanced Technology in Law And Society,” University of New Hampshire, 
Benchmarks and Blueprints, April 2002. 
63 Ibid, with citation of Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service Film, “The 
Colebrook Incident,” film dialogue. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Very High Frequencies (VHF) operate in the mid-range of all public safety frequency spectrums, 
providing a balance of long distance reach and in-building coverage. Generally operated with multiple units 
able to talk and listen on the same frequency. 
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number of firefighters and their geographical separation from the incident commander 
increases. As the fire grew out of control and both channels became increasingly 
overloaded, ‘communications discipline completely broke down’ which further interfered 
with interoperability.66 ‘In addition, the State of California had licensed three VHF 
channels, referred to as ‘White One, White Two, and White Three,’ for fire mutual aid 
state wide. All fire apparatus in the State was to be equipped with radios operating on 
these frequencies. However, some fire departments were no longer equipped with VHF 
radios, and some others changed the names of the channels. The lack of standard 
procedures (nomenclature) further hampered over-the-air interoperability.”67 
Establishing common interoperability channels is a frequently used strategy to 
enable communications between agencies. This use of common channels can be 
effective, but this case typifies the tendency to allow such contingencies to become 
ineffective through lack of maintenance. Local jurisdictions need to enter into common 
governance agreements and task people to assure compliance and preparedness. While 
instantaneous interoperability is provided, it will be critical to manage the flow and 
volume of radio traffic through end-user, point of source, radio traffic management 
techniques. 
3. Texas Case Study from a Regional Fire Training Exercise in October 
2005 
Modeled after the U.S. Navy TADMUS air warfare decision making experiments 
described in Section III, the thesis author conducted a study in the fall of 2005, involving 
coding communications from a series of training exercises in the suburban cities north of 
Dallas, Texas. The specific purpose of the exercises was to practice working with other 
agencies, through a scripted series of actions to be taken at the scene of a simulated 
multiple-alarm structure fire. The exercises were held at a training academy where 
facilities allow for burning of straw and special effect lighting to create realistic building 
fire conditions. While the participants were focused on tactics and accomplishment of 
operational objectives, this case study enabled analysis of the communications conducted 
toward those goals. This is especially significant in validating the findings since the 
                                                 
66 Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee, Interoperability White Paper, April, 1996, 3-4.10. 




participants weren’t knowingly engaging in a study on communications, but rather using 
radios as they normally would at a building fire, with several separate agencies working 
together. 
The goal for this study was to measure the quality of first responder 
communications to determine where improvements in communications can be made. 
Table 1 presents a description of the types of units participating in the training exercise, 
along with metrics relating to the communications conducted during the exercise. Table 2 
present results of the communications coding analysis. 
Number of Fire Departments Participating 5 
Number of Engine Companies 6 
Number of Truck Companies (or Engines w/Elevated Streams) 5 
Medical Units (Ambulances) 2 
Duration of the Exercise in Minutes 62 
Number of Communications Turns 428 
Average Length of Each Message in Seconds 7 
Number of Words Broadcast 3556 
Average Number of Words Per Communications Turn 8 
Average Number of Words per Minute 57 
 
Table 1. Training Exercise 
Participants were from a number of surrounding career departments, deployed in 
two-to-four person teams on engines, ladder trucks and medical units. This exercise was 
typical of others in the multi-week series, insomuch as there were 13 units, totaling about 
50 firefighters and command officers. Each participant was provided with a portable 
radio on a common channel, with the incident commander and an aide seated in a 
command car (a sport utility vehicle), operating on a mobile radio. 
4. Evaluation Methodology 
The thesis author obtained a recording of the radio transmissions occurring during 
the exercise, from which a written transcript was produced. This provided the basis for 
scoring the communications conducted.68 Notations were made and tabulated for: 
                                                 
68 Included in Appendix A. 
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1. Instances in which the message was not received or was unclear and had to be 
repeated. 
2. A subjective assessment rating of the excitement level of the voice (either 
normal, or excited). 
3. Use of any codes or phases other than “plain English.” 
4. A subjective assessment rating on whether the message was critical to 
operational picture development and/or tactical efficiency, or whether another 
method could have been employed. 
 
5. Findings 
% of Turns # of Turns Anomaly Type 
11.9% 51 Unacknowledged Message 
4.9% 21 Needed to be Repeated 
2.6% 11 Confused/Unclear/Questionable Value 
1.2%   5 Exclamatory/Excited Message 
 
Table 2. Communications Anomaly Analysis Summary 
 
The percentage of messages needing to be repeated was 4.9%; plus 11.9% of the 
radio messages were unacknowledged (33 out of the 51 unacknowledged messages were 
to the incident commander), and were presumed to be unheard. In addition, 2.6% of the 
communications turns were judged to be a questionable use of radio airtime, e.g. face-to-
face message exchange may have been more appropriate, instances of redundant 
information communicated, or information of questionable value transmitted. The 
collective total of repeated, unacknowledged, and questionable communications turns 
equaled 19.4% of all messages, indicating a significant opportunity to reclaim nearly one-
fifth of all radio airtime lost to such inefficiencies. 
It should be noted that a few of the repeated messages occurred because personnel 
were trying to talk while wearing an airpack facepiece. Interference caused by the airpack 
facepiece has been an area of concern for many years, with only marginal success in 
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technological improvement.69 This was not a major contributing factor, since the 
messages were discernable on the recordings reviewed. 
One way to improve the communications efficiency rating would be to provide 
training on better prioritization of radio messages and introduction of the concept of 
communication alternatives, other than public safety radio. Face-to-face communication 
and sector-level task coordination are examples of ways to achieve objectives without use 
of radio resources. 
The presence of unacknowledged messages to the incident commander is an area 
of concern, and was noted in other un-scored exercises in this series, as well as the 
recordings studied from actual emergencies. Further research is needed to fully assess 
predominant reasons for such inattention, since radio problems and clarity of the message 
were not noted on the recording. The incident commander was presumably attending to 
something else at that instant. 
It would be beneficial to assign personnel at the emergency scene exclusively to 
facilitate communications support for the incident commander. Some large first 
responder departments have such scene-based communications capabilities (aides, chiefs’ 
drivers, etc). Other agencies should seek creative ways to develop such expertise, perhaps 
detailing first-arriving support personnel (who often self-dispatch to large-scale 
incidents). Greater operational efficiency, enhanced crew safety, and “reclamation” of 
scarce radio airtime can be expected if communications support personnel operate inside 
a quiet environment, at the command post, with the incident commander. 
Communications specialists should be supplied with adjunct devices, such as headphones 
and visual displays, allowing them to pay close attention to radio traffic and assist the 
incident commander in communications continuity. 
To the credit of the departments involved, the use of non-standard codes was not 
noted in the exercise studied. The only code used was “10-4,” which is universally 
recognized as meaning a message has been received. Use of codes and phrases not 
                                                 
69 Greater attention is needed to the issue of responder communications while wearing respirator 
facepieces. Many agencies with limited experience in communicating while using respirator facepieces, 
especially in law enforcement, have issued respirators to their personnel, using homeland security grants. 
Extensive training and exercises should be provided for people new to operating with such equipment, prior 
to entry into hazardous environments. 
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understood by all was a concern at other, non-scored, exercises in the series, leading to 
renewed examination of “plain English” policies. (See Section V.B.4 for additional 
discussion on the need for plain English during joint operations.) 
Observation of the participants in this regional fire training exercise revealed they 
were able to successfully maneuver their portable radios to the proper common 
operational platform, with spare radios supplied to those without compatible radios. It is 
significant, however, that the users were coached and prompted on how to set their 
radios, during a pre-exercise briefing, in well-lit, supportive surroundings. While it was 
encouraging to see such adaptability and inclusion of radio orientation is an appropriate 
component of any such mutual aid exercise, it can be expected to need regular 
reinforcement and will likely be more difficult to accomplish under stress, low lighting 
conditions, and at the peak of operational demands. A strong case for radio orientation 
and communications checks, as a part of the staging-area process, was made by this 
observation. 
The Incident Commander conducted a roll-call, upon abandoning interior 
operations, after being on-scene for about 34 minutes. The process, known as Personnel 
Accountability Report (PAR), involves individually calling each unit’s command officer 
for a verification of crew safety. The process consumed 33 communications turns, using 
over five minutes of airtime. Anything that can be done to automate this process, such as 
technological aids, would allow for near-instantaneous information, without the need to 
call each unit individually. A positive aspect was noted, however, in that the 
communications following the PAR process were more orderly and did not have the 
number of unacknowledged and repeated communications turns, immediately preceding 
the evacuation of the structure. The PAR process affords a rare “time out” from tactical 
operations and resulted in reestablishment of efficient communications flow. Incident 






Further evidence of the need and challenge to optimize every word for maximum 
clarity and unambiguous syntax was revealed in the relatively rapid and clipped pace of 
chatter—the average was eight words per transmission, at a rate of 57 words per minute 
(nearly one word per second). 
Another caveat to consider when assessing these results is to remember this was 
just a training exercise. The participants had general foreknowledge of what was to occur 
and while some risk was associated with the creation of a minimally hazardous 
environment, with real smoke, there was not the added urgency of people awaiting 
rescue, yelling for help, risk of secondary anti-personnel devices, or compromising of the 
building’s structural integrity in this controlled environment, compared to the real thing. 
Yet despite these favorable factors, an element of emotional excitement, attributable to 
many of the same factors that would be present at an actual incident, were noted. In five 
of the 428 communications turns studied, the message was delivered with a measure of 
excitement in the voice, including, “…Stop,” “All units, hold your traffic, stand by…,” 
“… a lot of heat and smoke,” and “…going to withdraw!” These messages were 
consistent with those noted in other, actual incidents, but they did not contribute to an 
escalation of the excitement level of other users (as sometimes is the case,) perhaps 
because it was a training exercise, with only a minimal hazardous environment present. It 
should be anticipated that the pace and depth of the systemic weaknesses would be 
greater under actual emergency situations. 
6. New York 
In the summer of 2005, the New York City Fire Department (FDNY) was 
compelled by court order to release 900 minutes of radio recordings between dispatchers 
and fire and emergency medical service personnel from the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. While the 9/11 Commission Report goes into extensive detail on the lapses of 
communications on that day, both intra- and extra-departmentally, a complete auditory 
review of the entire series of tapes revealed additional emotional components which did 
not always come through in written transcripts.70 The report cites both technological and 
“business practice” influences as causal factors in the communications breakdown. 
                                                 
70 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
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The FDNY has the most robust response capability to respond to major incidents, 
and indeed had a greater depth of experience in dealing with urban disasters than any 
department in the United States. Although the methods and procedures that had become 
tried and true over the years largely failed them on that day, the factors leading to the 
communications failures were strikingly similar to other nationwide incidents studied.  
The subject of first responder radio communications in New York City in general, 
and on 9/11 in particular, would take a thesis unto itself to adequately describe and do the 
subject justice. Perhaps that is why some of the discussions about radio practices 
conducted by the 9/11 Commission seemed, by some, to be myopic and misdirected.71 It 
is a complex and difficult discussion to have in sound bites and a sentence or two where 
several pages would be necessary to adequately describe all of the factors. 
A series of excerpts is included in this section to provide the reader with a flavor 
of what occurred that day; these excerpts were carefully selected to prove a point, i.e., 
that there are predictable communications failures during emergencies, attributable to 
specific factors. This edited version does not paint a complete picture of the many heroic, 
competent, and effective communications first responders initiated that day. 
It is appropriate to recognize that some of the voices contained on these tapes 
were either of those who later lost their lives in the heroic effort, or were making 
reference to those who did. As such, they are reviewed and treated with an appropriate 
measure of respect and honor. Any criticisms made, which may directly or inadvertently 
implicate any individual who later became a casualty, is meant only in the spirit of 
process improvement for future teams facing similarly cataclysmic circumstances, and is 
not meant in any way to diminish their sacrifice, especially considering that they were 





                                                 
71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
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Selected radio transmissions, 
New York City Emergency Medical Service (EMS) and 
Fire Department (FDNY) Personnel 
on September 11, 2005:72 
 
Comments by the thesis author are included in [brackets]. 
[Units have already responded to the initial reports of a plane crashed into one of 
the World Trade Center towers.] 
9:18 a.m.  
Caller to EMS Central Dispatch: I'm inside the subway station on the corner of 
Vesey and Church. I have three aided downstairs, two females, one male that 
needed to be transported ... This is horrible. 
[Specific information superfluous with so many injured; emotional 
utterance heightens tension. Better to establish triage/treatment/transport sectors.] 
9:34 a.m.  
Call to EMS dispatcher: 12 Charlie. Be advised I have seven ambulances, seven 
ambulances no bosses sitting on West Street and Vesey Street, West and Vesey. 
We have no bosses, seven ambulances and no idea what to do. 
[Command lapse creates need to call for orders, using valuable airtime.] 
 
9:42 a.m.  
Manhattan FDNY Dispatcher: Manhattan calling Fieldcom with an urgent.  
Field Communications Unit [Fieldcom]: Proceed. Manhattan-Fieldcom.  
                                                 
72 Newsday, Inc., “Audio: Dramatic Radio Transmissions from September 11,” August 22, 2005. 
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Dispatcher: All right. Male hanging from a window near the antenna on Building 
One [One World Trade Center, or north tower]. That would be on the top floor. 
OK.  
 [Use of the word “urgent” was helpful to command attention and should 
be used whenever appropriate; dramatic message increases tension.] 
9:46 a.m.  
Fieldcom calling Manhattan. On the 80th floor, northwest corner, 50 people 
trapped. That's in Building One.  
[One of many situational updates for command from callers to 911. Opportunity 
to handle via data transfer from 911 to incident commanders at the scene would 
be helpful and would make more airtime available.] 
***  
FDNY Dispatcher: OK, Fieldcom, 104th floor northwest corner, 50 people 
trapped. The fire's burning beneath them.  
 [Added urgency to an already critical situation.] 
Fieldcom: What building?  
Dispatcher: That's Building One.  
Unidentified: (inaudible) ... three to Manhattan, urgent. One of the buildings is 
partially collapsed... the area...  
 [Clipped phrases caused by the radio cutting in and out convey limited 
operational picture.] 
Dispatcher: Identify yourself.  
Unidentified: (inaudible) ... three. A major collapse in one of the towers.  
 [Difficulty in authenticating caller and pin-pointing location.] 
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Dispatcher: Which tower?  
Unidentified: Tower Two. [2 WTC, or south tower.] 
9:49 a.m.  
Unidentified Firefighter: Tommy, have you made it back down to the lobby?  
Tommy: The elevator's screwed up.  
Firefighter: You can't move it?  
Tommy: I don't want to get stuck in the shaft.  
Firefighter: All right, Tommy. It's imperative that you try to get down to the lobby 
command post and some people up to 40. We got injured people up here on 70. If 
you make it to the lobby command post, see if they can somehow get the elevators 
past the 40th floor. We got people injured all the way up here. 
 
 [Individual tactical discussions between two persons cannot be supported 
when dozens of people are assigned to the same radio frequency, and higher 
priority communications needs exist. Such would be entirely appropriate at 
routine incidents, but inefficient when multiple urgent situations are occurring.] 
9:59 a.m.  
Tower Two collapses as the citywide dispatcher tries to reach the command post 
on the radio.  
Dispatcher: Box 8084 [refers to commanders assigned to the incident], what is the 
command post? Box 8084 (clicking, then silence)  
Dispatcher: I need the location of the command post.  
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 [Loss of continuity of communications with command—positioning of 
command post away from immediate area would increase likelihood of 
continuous command.] 
 
Unknown voice (yelling): Explosion! 
 [Unidentified reports from individuals clouds accurate command and 
control—ideally the same command officer should be giving overall situational 
updates.] 
Dispatcher: Car 65 command post is Church and Fulton, Church and Fulton.  
Unknown voice: Citywide, the tower just collapsed.  
Unknown voice: Citywide, be advised the tower was (garbled).  
Dispatcher: Everybody just standby, standby! [Dispatcher attempts to untangle 
overlapping radio reports.] 
9:59 a.m.  
Two World Trade Center, south tower, collapses.  
Marine [Boat] 6: Marine 6 to Manhattan.  
Dispatcher: Manhattan to Fieldcom.  
Marine [Boat] 6: Marine 6 to Manhattan. Urgent. Tower Two has had a major 
explosion and what appears to be a complete collapse... 
 [Better-quality information from a unit at a detached position of 
perspective; emotional control of voice lends authentication to the message.] 
10:01 a.m.  
8Adam: We're responding down to the MCI [Mass Casualty Incident].  
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Manhattan Central Emergency Medical Dispatcher: Negative, negative, I need 
you for something else.  
 [Dispatcher is trying to attend to other medical emergencies in the rest of 
the city. “Self-dispatching” is a common feature at large-scale incidents, leading 
to a loss of tactical resource deployment and potential targets for secondary 
attack.] 
8Adam: The tower [2 World Trade Center, south tower] has collapsed. The tower 
has collapsed.  
10:04 a.m.  
Unknown voice to dispatcher: I'm on West Side Highway, I'm at cross street to 
Wall Street. I've got FD personnel down, I got EMS personnel down, dispatchers 
and so forth. I have debris all over my vehicle. I cannot move at this time.  
 [Unidentified, yet helpful in its descriptiveness] 
Dispatcher: All right, 10-4, 10-4.  
Unknown voice: Supervisor, I have a fireman who was caught here in the 
explosion live over here severely injured.  
(Sound of someone gasping, then silence) 
 [Injured comrades increases anxiety levels] 
10:05 a.m.  
Unknown caller to dispatcher: The former staging area at Vesey and West is no 
longer usable. (garbled) set up a staging at Vesey and North End.  
Unknown caller: What is the best access to the staging?  
Dispatcher: No best access at this time, there is no best access. 
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10:07 a.m.  
NYPD Aviation unit says 1 World Trade Center, north tower, is leaning and in 
danger of collapse.  
07 NORA: There was some sort of explosion. Half of the crews are unaccounted 
for... 1 World Trade.  
10:12 a.m.  
Unknown caller to EMS dispatcher: We're right in front of the building that 
collapsed at the Trade Center. I'm stuck with a patient here who has possibly a 
broken hip. I need some help if anybody can get over here possibly.  
 [Single victim among hundreds awaiting assistance; ineffective use of 
limited airtime, given the scope of what was occurring.] 
Dispatcher, frustrated: Sir, we have numerous people trapped at this time, 
numerous priorities. The first unit available will be sent to you.  
10:19 a.m.  
22Adam: (alarmed) Can you assist me with the ... I am on scene. I am Albany 
Street and South End Avenue.  
Numerous fire, PVs, and ambulance on hand with me. We have no idea where 
we're going. Where is the safe area?  
 [Individual command issues, instead of staging and sector control] 
Manhattan Emergency Medical Dispatcher: All right 22Adam, Vesey and where?  
22Adam: 22Adam, Albany street, Albany Street and South End Avenue.  
 [Message repeating] 
EMS Dispatcher: 22Adam, calm down.  
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22Adam: I have to yell, I can't everything.  
 [Emotional component in voice degrades communications] 
Unidentified: ... off so we can hear him.  
EMS Dispatcher: It's Vesey and Chambers.  
22Adam, if you're going to be like this on the air you need to stay off. 
 [Tension leads to rude communications turn] 
10:27 a.m.  
Manhattan Central Emergency Medical Dispatcher: 32X, go, where are you?  
32X: We got a four ... That one has third-degree burns throughout his face. I'm 
gonna go to St. Vinnie's [St. Vincent’s Hospital] with all four …, is that OK? 
There's no conditions for us here.  
 [Individual hospital requests demand too much airtime. Instead, a system 
of triage, treatment, standing orders utilization and silent transport will conserve 
airtime.] 
10:28 a.m.  
1 World Trade Center, north tower, collapses.  
10:30 a.m.  
Firefighter: Call to Command Post Manhattan South. Me and my partner are both 
OK ... We have building collapse. We have total blackness ... .we have no 
visibility. We have no way to get out of here ... Charlie to Central: Mayday. 
 [Emotional component of message indicating comrade is in immediate 




Mobile Command Center: The other tower has collapsed. Major collapse. Major 
collapse  
***  
Marine Boat 3: Everybody get out, we had a collapse of the second tower ... All 
units, we have received a report that No. 1 and No. 2 World Trade Center have 
collapsed -- both towers.  
 [Clearest operational picture conveyed from detached position of 
perspective from the waterfront a few blocks away.] 
***  
Battalion 26: We are at Broadway and Vesey. A huge dust cloud, people are all 
around.  
* **  
Dispatcher: Manhattan to Division 11.  
(Silence).  
Dispatcher: Any other unit for Manhattan.  
(Silence).  
FDNY Dispatcher: Manhattan to Fieldcom.  
 [No answer—a bad sign—very unusual occurrence when radios are still 
working] 
 
Unidentified Firefighter: George, have them mobilize the Army. We need the 
Army in Manhattan.  
 [Never before said, heard, or contemplated in fire department operations, 
to be sure. Sender conveys a frantic tone in his voice.] 
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FDNY Dispatcher: All units stand by. Everyone try to calm down. Manhattan to 
Fieldcom.  
 [Dispatcher works to reassure in the face of multiple crisis 
communications.] 
(Silence)  
FDNY Dispatcher: Manhattan to - Manhattan to -- Manhattan to Car 9. Urgent. 
Manhattan to Car 9. Urgent.  
(Silence)  
All right. Manhattan to any unit operating at the fifth alarm West Street, at Liberty 
Street, at Tower No. 2. Any unit. Any unit operating at No. 2 World Trade Center 
at the collapse. Contact Manhattan by radio forthwith.  
FDNY Dispatcher: OK, Car 33 Bravo, we understand there was some kind of 
major collapse. Can you report?  
Emergency Medical Service worker: This is an EMS worker. There's been a 
major collapse. We need additional units forthwith.  
 [As no command staff answers, dispatcher seeks anyone to answer.] 
***  
07Nora: Several of the crews are unaccounted for. We had two units on the scene 
and we had a Jeep on the scene. Half of the crew is unaccounted for. Visibility is 
bad.  
Manhattan Central Emergency Medical Dispatcher: Are you saying that these 
people are involved? EMS involved?  
07Nora: ... (unintelligible)  
 [Among the many unclear communications turns] 
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Dispatcher: OK, 7Nora. 10-5 [repeat] your message. You're saying because of the 
tower collapse, the captain was involved in this?  
7Nora: 10-4. We're setting up a... (GARBLED)... are falling.  
(Silence)  
 [Ineffective, clipped phrasing] 




A civilian voice.  
Unidentified Civilian: (shouting) Can anybody hear me. I'm a civilian. I'm trapped 
inside one of your fire trucks underneath a collapse that just happened.  
FDNY Dispatcher: Stand by, there's somebody close to you.  
Civilian: I can't breathe much longer. Please save me. I'm in the cab of your truck.  
FDNY Dispatcher: OK, person transmitting the Mayday. Where are you?  
Civilian: I just told you. If you look at the World Trade Center, there's the north 
pedestrian bridge. I think it just collapsed ... I was on the street. I don't have much 
air. Please help me.  
Firefighter: I copy that, I'm going to go look for him.  
Civilian: I can barely breathe, please send somebody.  
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FDNY Dispatcher: OK, person calling for help. Listen to me. You need to calm 
down and relax. Stand by. We do have somebody on the way. Maintain air. Get 
off the air. We do have somebody on the way over to you. You are to remain 
calm. 10-4?  
Civilian: I'm in the cab of a truck.  
 [Also unprecedented- increases an already tense situation] 
 
FDNY Dispatcher: Manhattan to any unit at World Trade Center 2. Urgent. EMS 
Ladder 15, I want you to go to the nearest chief, fire department chief, and have 
him come to the radio forthwith. If you find anybody with a white hat, get him to 
come to the radio. I need a report to find out what else I can send to him ... Let me 
know who is in command there at this moment. 
 [Dispatcher desperately attempts to restructure command and control, 
from his remote location.] 
11:10 a.m.  
At the scene, trapped firefighters begin to radio for help.  
Firefighter: I'm trapped here  
FDNY Dispatcher: Rear of tower of number one?  
Dispatcher: There is help on the way. Calling any unit to assist the trapped 
firefighters.  
FDNY Dispatcher: Calling any members to assist trapped firefighters... 
11:18 a.m.  
FDNY Dispatcher: I have a trapped firefighter --  
Firefighter: Chief V -- is trapped, I have him... I need some help getting him out --  
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FDNY Dispatcher: We have some units coming, we are coming in a city bus. 
11:31 a.m.  
In the aftermath of the towers' collapse, confusion reigns in lower Manhattan. 
FDNY Dispatcher: All units, a report of a bomb in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel.  
FDNY Dispatcher: We have a number of city buses at the Brooklyn bridge [filled 
with firefighters].  
FDNY Dispatcher: Calling Capt. V.? Come in, Captain V. if you hear me? 
Calling the unit looking for Capt. V.?  
 [Multiple, unrelated conversations invite inappropriate assumptions] 
(Confusion)  
FDNY Dispatcher: I'm getting four different chiefs giving me four command 
posts. I have Park and Vesey, West and … 
Chambers, Liberty Command, and Church Command. You guys have to help me 
out, here.  
FDNY Dispatcher: All units -- calling Captain V. -- come in if you read me... 
(end of published summary) 
In the hours following, command and communications were reestablished at the 
largest, most difficult rescue and recovery operation ever conducted in urban America. 
While the radio equipment itself and all forms of communications between the fire and 
police departments were extensively questioned in the months and years following, the 
preceding selected radio transmissions indicate a need for changes to radio procedures. 




1. Manage and reduce the amount of radio transmissions. 
2. Establish procedures and policies for treatment of large numbers of casualties 
without the need to call for help individually for each one. 
3. Command and control from a detached perspective aids in the quality of the 
information provided and in the vocal emotional control of those transmitting. 
 
C. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT FOCUS 
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many officials reported communications 
issues between responders within the same department and with other agencies. These all 
struck a familiar chord since many of the same things were said after the Oklahoma City 
Bombing and Columbine school shooting, in addition to numerous incidents of regional 
significance around the country. 
Since that time, interoperability has arisen as a top grant funding priority. The 
rush to address the issue has made it all too easy for agencies to select equipment without 
much thought or due diligence.  
Immediately following 9/11, homeland security funds were first distributed in the 
manner we were most familiar with, i.e. “pork barrel” spending methodology. The 
distribution methods vacillated between one extreme where the most politically powerful 
were able to bring money to their home districts, and the other extreme where an equal 
distribution method resulted in an attempt to evenly distribute grant money to every state, 
which produced uneven per-capita expenditures in places where risk seemed remote. To 
answer the charges that a risk-based formula should be used, the Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) funding system was devised in 2003 to skew the resource distribution 
toward the highest density of U.S. urban areas.  
In the short history of homeland security grant funding, we have experienced a 
unique pressure to make quantum improvements in our homeland security posture, 
literally “before the next attack.” The immediacy of the moment encouraged a process in 
which jurisdictions were under extreme time constraints to submit grant applications or 
risk the appearance and actuality of not getting money for the local effort, in competition 
with other cities nationwide. The tendency was to cursorily scan the “menu” of 
equipment available in standardized grant request forms, quickly make a choice (which 
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generically would be identified as something like, “interoperability equipment”), and get 
the verbiage and justification prepared in a short time span, before the arrival of 
immediate, inflexible deadlines. Then a few months would typically pass, and if 
approved the radio patching equipment would arrive, without much forethought on how it 
would be used, who would operate it, any potential security vulnerability it may create, 
and any deleterious effect it may have on communications networks. 
In essence, the cost of such equipment previously drove agencies to a deliberate 
process of alternative evaluations and careful selection based on operational needs. In the 
years since 9/11, it not only is easier to access the funds, but the process itself has 
encouraged haphazard requests for radio interconnection equipment and resulted in the 
development of unrealistic expectations. 
The expedited process has fostered a very real concern regarding the effect such 
equipment will have on the disaster operations of the future. While the equipment does 
hold the potential to improve emergency scene communications, improved 
communications will only result if the new equipment is deployed properly and if the 
users modify their radio habits. The likely outcome of having only a superficial 
appreciation of what the equipment operator is doing, and continuance of overly-chatty 
radio turns, will hasten the collapse of communications networks (due to overload), 
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V. CREATIVE SOLUTIONS – A BETTER WAY 
A. PROCEDURAL MODIFICATION 
It is a truism of human nature that people revert, in times of crisis, to what is 
familiar and practiced. As the “fight or flight” survival mechanism kicks in, the brain has 
a lot to do on behalf of the host: chemically regroup the body so major muscle groups are 
ready for immediate action, process multiple sensory input, make quick sense of some 
things, entirely ignoring other information. The most well-intentioned plans and 
procedures can look very good on paper and fail to translate into valuable guidance 
during times of crisis, unless the limitations of the human physical and cognitive 
functions are considered. 
The intention of this section is to anticipate the companion behavioral 
components of radio interoperability, divert the dominant focus from technology, and 
devise a template for agencies interested in optimizing their mission-critical 
communications. In doing so, the result will be better, more realistic expectations, and 
more effective communications within the limits of public safety radio infrastructure. 
These strategies will likely gain widespread acceptance only after a series of practical 
failures continue, despite the expenditure of so much homeland security grant money to 
achieve “interoperability.” Proactive agencies have an opportunity now to be early 
adopters of procedural adaptation and will avoid inevitable failures of those relying 
exclusively upon a hardware solution. 
1. New Paradigm 
Consistent with the principles articulated in this thesis, a set of new procedures 
were drafted for the first responder agencies at the author’s city. The city of Plano, Texas, 
is adjacent to the city of Dallas and is the home to 250,000 people. A separate 
department, Public Safety Communications, is responsible for the receipt of 911 calls and 
dispatching of the police, fire and medical units. The department also operates the radio 




As is the case with many public agencies, equipment purchased with homeland 
security grants has begun to arrive from a number of sources. Little has been said about 
how to use it: the assumption has been that interoperability starts as soon as the boxes are 
opened. 
To overcome the inherent limitations of radio system patching of multiple units 
onto a common operational platform, a new procedure is proposed which prioritizes the 
use of limited radio resources, by controlling the flow at the source. After review of 
numerous critical incidents involving various combinations of fire, police, medical, local, 
and mutual aid units, responding to single and multi-jurisdictional incidents, a common 
pattern of influences was noted: 
1. Responding units tended to stop at the first injured person encountered at 
the periphery of the incident and call for an ambulance to that specific 
location, even when it was obvious that a mass casualty incident was 
underway, involving dozens, or even hundreds of victims. 
2. Turns of communications became clipped into ineffective bits, to the point 
where it was difficult to tell who was talking to whom. 
3. If a field unit expressed excitement in their voice, the dispatcher’s voice 
tended to also rise in pitch and pace, but not to the full extent of the field 
users’. The dispatcher plays a key roll in keeping everyone calm by the 
use of a controlled voice inflection and in exuding a stoic confidence. 
4. Units prefacing their transmissions with key words, such as “urgent” 
“priority message” or “emergency traffic,” got greater attention than those 
continuing to talk unacknowledged and without preface, even if they 
conveyed urgency in the pitch and pace of their speech. 
5. Many incidents eventually got to the point where dispatchers and incident 
commanders tried to control and reduce the volume of radio traffic by who 
was talking. Requests such as “all units stand-by” and “command officers 
only on this channel,” were commonly heard. 
6. A relatively small number of units dominated a majority of the airtime, 
often with non-critical matters, while many units said nothing. The 









7. The most assiduous dispatchers and commanders tried to anticipate those 
things the field users might ask, and act to broadcast a summary of 
information, before it is asked for, in an effort to preempt use of the radio 
channel for repetitious information requests. This includes best access 
routes, staging areas, triage points, command post locations, and brief 
situational updates. This relatively small menu of variables made up a 
disproportionate number of repetitious and superfluous radio 
transmissions. 
8. The use of timed milestone updates gave the most even flow of 
information, acknowledging that time often gets out of phase—either 
faster or slower, to the perception of those involved at the scene. Many 
dispatch computer systems have automated features to trigger prompts to 
the dispatcher at timed intervals, i.e. every ten or 20 minutes. Dispatcher-
initiated requests for updates from incident commanders, at timed-
intervals, aids in development of an operational picture for those at the 
scene, as well as for support players off-site (still responding, or at 
alternate locations, such as Emergency Operations Centers). 
9. Listening to recordings after an incident readily allows for identification of 
inappropriate assumptions and ineffective (“not what was meant,”) 
communications, and unacknowledged speech turns not evident to those 
involved at the moment. This can be attributed to the calm environment 
the reviewers are in and the lack of multi-sensorial stimuli imposed upon 
those performing as the incident was actually occurring. While it is not 
possible to eliminate all distractions and simultaneous demands placed 
upon those operating at emergency scenes, the inference here is great 
value would be derived if sensory input was managed and limited. 
 
2. New Procedure Proposed 
As a result of reviewing numerous recordings of critical incidents, it is apparent 
that the best practice would involve modification of radio system utilization, at the 
source, to optimize the quality of communications occurring to produce “better” not 
“more” communications turns. 
To answer this need, a new procedure was devised by the thesis author whereby 
field units will modify their utilization of the system, once declaration of a “critical 
incident” is made. This is not necessary for a routine building fire or bank robbery, but 
once a critical mass of units start arriving at an intense incident, such as would be the 
case at a terrorist attack, it would be invoked to prioritize radio traffic. 
The policy draft presented to the Plano Fire Department, by the thesis author,  
reads in part: 
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A.  It must be recognized that significant single or multiple events can create a 
communications system overload situation that negatively impacts scene operations. The 
expected, and understandable, emotional state of radio system users, combined with the 
shear number of units transmitting on a system, will frequently contribute to a disaster 
scene communications breakdown. There has been a tendency by some agencies to 
fragment operational groups at the same incident, onto different radio system talk-paths 
(talkgroups, channels, frequencies). While assigning additional talkgroups to sectorized 
functions provides some buffering, it must be remembered that it will become difficult 
for dispatchers and incident commanders to effectively monitor and control multiple 
talkgroups. Moreover, there is a practical limit to the number of simultaneous 
conversations possible on systems that typically are shared by several agencies, and 
routine radio traffic, will continue, in addition to the specific incident. 
Such a “less is more” posture, involving radio system use, runs counter to the 
policies practiced in daily response to routine incidents. All members must make a 
conscious effort at disaster scenes to resist the habits practiced in normal operations and 
limit their use of the radio system to the highest priority of life safety needs. 
1. Effective communication between dispatch and the incident commander 
must be the highest priority, based on the need to properly report size-up (initial appraisal 
of the scene), operational picture, and requests for additional resources. 
a. To that end, dispatch will initiate a Priority Dispatch Policy whenever an 
intensive incident is underway and channel capacity issues are hampering effective 
communications: 
• Dispatch will announce, “the Priority Dispatch Policy is now in effect” 
• A periodic, soft beeping tone will automatically be played on the 
channel as a reminder of the special condition. 
• Dispatch will answer with, “(Unit #) go ahead with priority traffic.” 
• Units operating on the channel will suspend routine traffic (calling en 
route, requesting assignments, repeating size-ups, etc). To support this 
step, dispatch will endeavor to broadcast (and periodically repeat) 




• Calling dispatch on the phone should be avoided since the incident 
itself is likely to stretch 911 Center capacity. The computer system 
should be used to achieve silent unit status change notification. 
2. Unit-to-unit traffic must be reduced, condensed and prioritized, in the 
interest of system capacity conservation. 
• Transmission of “Maydays” and “Emergency Traffic” receives highest 
priority. 
• Whenever possible, transmission on the radio should be limited to 
command officers only. 
• Formation of self-contained task forces, based on alarm levels, moved-
up from staging, offer the greatest opportunity for task assignment and 
accomplishment, with minimal radio transmissions. 
• Face-to-face communication with sector officers, after assignment 
from staging, provides the greatest prospect for member safety and 
operational objective achievement, without the use of radio narration 
typical at routine incidents. In this mode, the radio becomes a receiver 
of critical information, only broadcast upon for immediate, life safety 
issues. 
• During such times of peak system loading, it will be necessary to 
suspend or significantly abbreviate the fire department SOP Section 
303.XII.A.7 (It states: When Incident Commanders issue assignments 
face-to-face, those assignments shall also be announced over the radio 
to insure that everyone at the incident is aware.) 
• Wherever practical, staging and sector officers will issue verbal, 
standing orders to be followed, until objective accomplishment, or 
until further notice. This will reduce the tendency of units to use 
airtime for task-related information, distracting to the overall 
operational picture. 
• At some point in all mass casualty incidents, it becomes impractical to 
make individual requests for ambulance responses, to specific victim 
locations. Whenever possible, low priority patients should be directed 
or assisted to a triage area, instead of requesting ambulances over the 
air to specific locations. 
• Within the limits of existing policy, patient reports to the hospital, 
broadcast on the radio system, should be appropriately abbreviated and 
standing orders implemented wherever practical. 




The main implementation challenge will be to get people to reverse their habits 
that have been developed and reinforced over years of day-to-day use of the system, and 
to apply new procedures for rare occurrences. This will be accomplished through training 
and practice at exercises.  
Full implementation across all disciplines and jurisdictions will need to go hand in 
hand with NIMS implementation. A centerpiece of the new procedure involves 
sectorizing the incident into manageable pieces, with command officers assigned to task 
and/or geographical locations. These commanders can assume a lot of line-of-sight and 
face-to-face communication with people in the task groups, thus eliminating much of the 
radio traffic at a critical incident. While the fire service has allowed sufficient time for 
incident command system principles to take hold, law enforcement and other agencies 
have considerable work ahead in transitioning from NIMS training to NIMS 
implementation. The Unified Command concept within NIMS is optimal when 
commanders from each agency are present together, at the same incident command post. 
While the separate command post concept is the practice in many locales, it probably has 
more to do with avoiding the “who’s in charge?” issue than it does with any practical 
advantage. Unified Command is much more difficult when communications paths must 
be relied upon, instead of the optimal communications method: face-to-face. 
3. Proof of Concept 
A training exercise is scheduled for 2006, where a multi-jurisdictional response 
will be made to a simulated terror act at a school building. This will be the first 
opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of this new procedure. While planners are intent 
upon the elements of the exercise itself, a case has been made for the need to focus on 
communications limitations and to utilize better sector control within NIMS. 
 
B. GOVERNANCE 
The drive for greater interoperability of radio communications has triggered more 
inter-agency policy development on how such assets should be utilized. There remains a 
need for greater control and governance over the use of interoperability equipment. While 
many jurisdictions have some history forming an alliance with a neighboring jurisdiction, 
it’s rare to see all neighboring jurisdictions participating equally, and to see cross-
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jurisdictional policies (police/fire, local/county/state/federal, etc.). With the hardware 
now making it possible to form ad hoc communications networks, it will be critical to get 
everyone involved to agree to common boundaries of utilization. 
1. Radio 
The patching equipment being provided through homeland security grants holds 
the potential for inadvertent impedance of emergency scene communications, by those 
not fully acclimated with the proper use of such equipment, and/or an appreciation of 
radio system architecture and the impact a single action may have on the network, as a 
whole.  
2. Data 
Interoperability initiatives have included more integration between the 
information systems used by public safety agencies. Most first responders receive 
information for responses through dispatchers using computer systems, commonly 
referred to as C.A.D. (Computer Aided Dispatch). From the moment a 911 call is 
received from the public, timestamps and address information is gathered within the 
computer system and pertinent information keyed-in by dispatch personnel. This forms 
an official record of the event and serves to instantaneously inform field responders of 
pertinent information, most often through in-vehicle computers and pagers. 
Another form of incident-specific data is that which is generated in the 
Emergency Operations Center (E.O.C.) environment. Incident management software 
captures key situational awareness components and would be of obvious benefit in 
incidents impacting entire regions. 
3. Process 
The advantage of being able to share such incident data between jurisdictions is 
obvious, and does constitute the wider umbrella of “interoperability,” beyond just radio 
voice communications. The caveat to be pondered, before jumping at such initiatives is 
the potential impact on individual system stability, network security, and command and 
control of those able to access information, and therefore able to act independently on 
self-initiated (and perhaps ill-advised) actions. 
Planning and diplomatic process needs to be instigated at the earliest sign of joint-
venture in the interoperability realm, since it takes time for relationships to build, trust to 
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be established, and formalized, written procedures agreed upon, drawn, signed, and 
implemented. It is one thing to be on a cordial footing at social events and occasional 
minor incidents, yet quite another to commit to print a collectively agreed upon set of 
operational policies involving how communications assets will be deployed, mixed, used, 
and controlled. 
4. Standardized Nomenclature 
Interoperability initiatives are sure to bring additional focus to the issue of 
agency-specific codes used over radio systems. While some departments have phased-out 
their use in recent years, others still cling to radio codes as an ingrained operating 
practice and custom. Claims of confidentiality value are quickly debunked since casual 
listeners can easily decode their meaning after monitoring the context in which a given 
code is used, over a period of time. This ironically gives the hobbyist scanner buff an 
edge over a potential first responder from another agency. First responders generally 
don’t have the means or inclination to listen over an extended period and build such 
knowledge. 
The International Association of Chiefs of Police recently addressed the 
Department of Homeland Security’s posture that 10-codes used over radio systems 
should be eliminated in the NIMS process, since 10-codes can confuse matters when 
separate agencies mix operations at the same event, especially if interoperability 
equipment is used to patch the radios of several agencies together. There is no national 
standard for such codes, leading to different meanings for the same code across 
jurisdictions, leading to the potential for critical errors in times of crisis communications. 
At the recent International Police Chiefs’ meeting, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 
yielded to the hue and cry of the membership to leave everything alone. This 
demonstrates further evidence that we have a major, “uphill battle” regarding any major 
changes to customs and traditional operating policies, even when the compelling need to 
overturn an existing practice is evident.73 
                                                 
73 Police Chief Magazine, “Police 10-Codes,” October 2005. “Homeland Security Secretary Michael 
Chertoff announced during his remarks at the 112th Annual Conference of International Association of 
Chiefs of Police in Miami Beach, Florida, on September 27, 2005, that the abolition of the police 10-codes 
will not be necessary for NIMS compliance.” Secretary Chertoff stated, “Under the implementation of the 
National Incident Management System there has been discussion of requiring the elimination of the 10-
code in every day law enforcement communications. However, there was a strong response from the law 
enforcement community against this proposal, and we listened to your concerns.” 
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C. PRACTITIONER SIMULATOR TRAINING 
First responder agencies are para-militaristic in nature, given to operational 
expectations being delineated within standard operating procedures (SOPs). This reality 
presents both a challenge and an opportunity, since a mechanism is in place to rapidly 
and formally institute a procedural change. The conundrum emerges, however, in 
translating the SOP to actionable, easy to remember and effective procedural changes that 
will produce modified behavior, under stressful conditions. All first responder agencies 
have some form of written rules or policies, some more detailed and aggressively enacted 
than others. So half the battle is getting the new policy written—the remaining and 
formidable challenge is in getting people to actually use it when appropriate.  
1. Recruits  
1. Most new first responders receive training in some form of 
academy format. Curricula should be devised to assure an 
intermediate level of understanding and appreciation for radio 
system design, limitations, and proper utilization. Cellular 
telephone analogies will be helpful, especially for the generation 
starting to populate first responder agencies. 
2. In addition, recruits should be trained in crisis communications, in 
the event it becomes necessary to reduce the number of 
transmissions made, in the interest of maintaining the system’s 
remaining capacity for prioritized messages.  
3. Alternate communications methods and NIMS principles should be 
presented as viable alternatives to word-for-word radio reliance.  
 
2. Continuing Education 
1. First-responders should receive in-service training on both key 
concepts and refreshers on existing system considerations, and any 
time new features or radio procedures are implemented.  
2. Careful design of the curriculum is necessary to overcome the 
natural tendency of first responders to overestimate their existing 
skill level and to underestimate the need for beyond-basics skills, 
other than those used in daily practice. 
A considerable opportunity exists for future development in the area of simulator 
training in communications, for first responders. Modeled after the aforementioned U.S. 
Navy TADMUS example, people expect to “train as they fight and fight as they train.” 
The sophistication level of training must be elevated to the expectation and orientation of 
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those being trained, especially considering the latest generation of first responders raised 
on video games and multi-sensory entertainment and education. 
We are challenged as a community of first responders to develop a new 
generation of training aids to improve our ability to maximize communications while 
running a disaster operation. 
3. On-site 
Hands-on, action-oriented people need training aids to match their style of doing 
business. Current computer technology, computer games, and enhanced hardware able to 
recreate a “virtual reality,” presents opportunity for a needed sense of “been there, done 
that,” for first responders, since they will only face truly cataclysmic events perhaps once 
in a career.  
A simple example would be one which is encountered repeatedly in the radio 
transmissions for the incident studied: Calling for an ambulance to a specific location, for 
a single patient, when multiple patients are awaiting help and communications volumes 
are on the brink of radio system collapse.  
Imagine the possibility of immersing a first responder in a virtual environment in 
which “people approach” on a large plasma display, as they stagger away from a realistic 
disaster scene, and ask for help with a cut finger. The “right” answer advocated by this 
thesis is to direct the “walking wounded” to triage and treatment locations and not reach 
for a radio. Those who choose the common and intuitive reflexive action of transmitting 
on the radio (i.e., on top of other simulated transmissions) would receive a prompt to 
select a better alternative. This same format could be used to practice radio reports of 
situational updates, with an emphasis on brevity, voice control, and maximized syntax. 
4. Web-based 
Modified versions of such a simulator environment could be recreated entirely in 
web-based education delivery format, allowing for self-paced instruction, and time-
transparent training. Features offered by web-based, asynchronous training are important 
to first responders who need to access training that conforms to their irregular duty hours. 
It’s also easy to envision an expanded format of web-based training, marrying the on-site 
and web-based deployments into a system of components interconnected to web-enabled 
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equipment, so the full experience of sight and sound can be accurately recreated beyond 
that which is possible on a single computer screen. 
Building on the experience many new recruits have with video games and the 
success the U.S. Army has had in recruiting new soldiers with their video games, it’s 
possible to envision the title of “high performing team member” bestowed upon those 
who progress into advanced levels of disaster-scene crisis communications “games.”74 
 
D. NEW SCENE COMMAND PARADIGMS 
Recognizing the intensive communications needs present for efficient emergency 
scene success, we should strive to find new and better ways to provide a support system 
for first responders at the scene. New technology holds the promise of better emergency 
scene communications support, but it will require examination of how personnel are 
deployed and operate during an emergency. Over the last two decades, some large first 
responder departments have begun to transition to a fixed base of command operations at 
large emergencies, requiring the transition of command personnel from literally standing 
in the street, to vehicle or building-based command posts. Such facilities provide a 
greater array of communications support, beyond that which can be dependably delivered 
over handheld, portable equipment. It admittedly takes time and personnel resources to 
deploy such assets, so we will always have the need to start operations with more limited 
capability, but the eventual deployment of enhanced capabilities will be of assistance in 
what typically becomes an extended operation. 
1. Data Displays 
Given that limitations exist regarding the delivery of voice communications at 
intense incidents, a potent possibility resides in providing data to operational 
commanders. Because of the way data is transmitted over communications systems, more 
data can be delivered (within the same amount of airtime) than a commensurate amount 
of voice communications. Using more data transfer, as an alternate to some of the voice 
information, reserves the most intuitive and valuable form—voice—for the higher 
priority messages.                                                   
74 CBS News, “Army Recruits Video Gamers,” March 30, 2004. 




Appropriate cautions regarding the need for human factors engineering to produce 
supportive information displays, and user-centered design to avoid information overload, 
are necessary to guard against overly optimistic expectations. When data is displayed in 
intuitive fashion, it will do a better job of supporting decision makers operating in 
stressful environments. Data needs to be displayed so it is readily deciphered without 
cumbersome interpretation or manual calculations necessary.75 Specifically designated 
resources personnel, completely familiar with advanced features of complex 
communications equipment, are key to successful deployment. It is unrealistic to expect 
the information management function to be fully maximized if it is considered to be an 
adjunct responsibility of a single incident commander, already overwhelmed with sensory 
input at the scene of cataclysmic events. 
Borrowing from the U.S. Navy’s Combat Information Center design, public 
safety vehicles should be ergonomically configured with communications facilitation in 
mind. The way the data is displayed on the screen is a key factor in the usefulness of the 
information and the ability of the operator to use it to maximum effect.76 
 
                                                 
75 Susan G. Hutchins, Research Associate Professor, interview with author, Naval Postgraduate 
School, July 22, 2005. “A key factor in the Vincennes incident was that altitude—in terms of whether the 
aircraft as ascending or descending—was not displayed. Operators had to calculate altitude by comparing 





Figure 3.   U.S. Navy’s Combat Information Center (From U.S. Naval Research Lab, 
Advanced Information Technology Branch, Virtual Combat Information Center) 
Graphic Rendering of a U.S. Navy Combat Information Center, provides a sample 
of the work done to optimize the human-technology interface. 
 
As command post vehicles and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) equipment 
are purchased with homeland security grant money, public safety agencies are well-
advised to apply principles of human design engineering. Recognition of the vast 
amounts of information available to responders, and the need to display the information 
in a useful format will require careful design, considering the tendency of people to 
become overwhelmed with too much information. 
2. Cameras in Public Places 
It is reasonable to assume that the number of cameras placed in public and semi-
public places (hotels, shopping malls, office buildings, schools, etc.) will continue to 
grow in the upcoming years. The technology to access such information will also allow 
viewing from remote locations, ideally suited for emergency scene operations. In the 
“one picture is worth a thousand words” vein, the ability to see the incident scene will 
greatly reduce the necessity of building situational awareness as a mosaic—one word at a 
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time. The challenge will be to display and analyze what is seen in a useful manner, while 
avoiding the pitfalls of information and sensory overload. 
3. Sector Vulnerability 
A final word is in order about the future of communications for emergency scene 
personnel. There is great temptation—and the vendor-driven market is poised to 
capitalize on the government money ready to be spent—to merge public safety 
communications with the communications systems used by the general public. On one 
hand, research and development is driven by the wider market and the mass production 
factors can provide cost benefits. In essence, the personal communications market for 
teenagers and young adult consumers is likely to drive the relatively smaller public safety 
telecommunications products development process. However, a number of demonstration 
projects are starting to lead to deployment of public safety communications systems over 
open architecture systems, often based on internet connections or other local wireless 
systems vulnerable to outside overload and attack.  
Up until this point in public safety communications evolution, we have enjoyed 
the benefit of distinct and isolated systems, invulnerable to outside influences. Since so 
many public safety personnel have started to rely on cell phones for primary and adjunct 
support of their missions, they have developed confidence in their stability and utility, 
only to be surprised and disappointed when they fail during times of intense public use. 
Some systems claim to provide prioritized service for first responder applications, but 
close scrutiny often reveals poor security protocols, lack of back-up power provisions at 
transmitter sites, software vulnerabilities, and a system architecture which still requires 
public safety users to compete with the general public for a finite set of radio channels 
and/or interface to the switched public telephone network. 
Quantum improvements in personal communications will certainly produce 
valuable applications for public safety personnel, especially in the areas of personal 
communications devices able to deliver text, voice, and video, but we must be mindful of 
the sector vulnerabilities present in the general public communications infrastructure. 
While we may be tempted to adopt the same devices used by the general public, 
especially if the features are more useful than what is available on our closed-network 
equipment, it is wise to remain mindful that the public infrastructure is vulnerable to 
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inadvertent or intentional interruption, at the hands of others. The nature of wireless and 
internet interconnectedness allows for an enemy thousands of miles away to exploit 
systems, with no personal risk and no proximity to the target. Much like the reliance field 
personnel develop on daily use of their portable radios, we too are becoming complacent 
in our assumptions about the stability of the internet, despite the multiple, known 





























VI. CONCLUSIONS DRAWN AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The present policy on radio usage during disaster operations by police and fire 
agencies is generally mute regarding any procedural changes from that which is applied 
in routine utilization of the radio systems on a daily basis. Nationwide, numerous reports 
have identified a problem with radio communications at the scene of disasters, yet the 
assumption has incorrectly been that the problem is largely a technical one: Once 
disparate radios are connected, communications will be facilitated. This is a flawed 
assumption since radio spectrum is a limited commodity—once it’s full, it’s full. Policies 
and practices need to be reexamined, from a behavioral/procedural perspective, to 
optimize the limited channel space we have, until new technologies can be developed and 
deployed to expand the capacity for more information to flow. Even if more information 
is available, we have discovered there are limitations to human utilization of large 
amounts of information in times of crisis. 
Many involved in the first responder community shy away from technical 
discussions about radio system architecture. We are comfortable using cellular 
telephones, for instance, but most would be hard-pressed to give a technically 
sophisticated description of how cellular telephone systems work. Similarly, this thesis 
takes a users’ perspective in devising reasonable strategies for the improvement of 
emergency scene radio communications, even for those with only a superficial 
knowledge of radio system theory. 
 
A. DETAILS OF THE CONCERN 
Homeland security efforts have been heavily focused upon interoperable radio 
communications for local emergency responders. Recent homeland security dictates have 
listed interoperability as the number one focus for those seeking grant funding. Post-
disaster analyses, including the 9/11 Commission Report, have described a common 
frustration of ineffective communications at the scene of emergencies.77 Assumptions 
made by the misinformed general public, as well as by public-sector policy makers, have 
                                                 
77 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
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led to a misguided solution strategy. Solution strategies currently being pursued may 
actually make matters worse, instead of better (via overloading systems by patching too 
many users together), despite hundreds of millions of public dollars awarded through 
grant funding to improve communications. 
With delivery of interoperable radio equipment to many public safety agencies 
nationwide, first responders are now technically able to link communications from a 
multitude of response units at the scene of a disaster. Emergency scene communications 
dynamics are inherently complex because many diverse organizations become involved. 
Patching equipment is far from a global, turn-key solution, and the potential to produce 
more harm than good, with such equipment, is present. 
The assumption to this point has been that the first responder communications 
issue is a technical one, i.e. separate radio platforms, or coverage issues leading to 
ineffective emergency communications. While this is often true, to some extent, this 
thesis argues that the majority of the future focus should be on procedural issues, 
considering the realities of how people perform during times of stress, rather than 
technically focused on how to patch radios together. Reviews of public safety radio 
transmissions during disasters, including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
reveal a mélange of words and excited phrases that are often conflicting, disconnected, or 
superfluous. 
In one such recording from 9/11, a police officer in New York City can be heard 
requesting an ambulance to a street corner for persons with relatively minor injuries 
(“walking wounded”). This would be a perfectly normal and reasonable request on nearly 
any other day when observing someone needing an ambulance—reach for the 
microphone and request an ambulance. Not to minimize the huge challenge facing 
emergency responders that day, and similar situations do occur in most large disasters—
but that 30 seconds of radio time could have been put to better advantage, considering 
that two of the tallest buildings in the world were about to fall down, and thousands of 





While the events of 9/11 are viewed through our hindsight of what did actually 
occur, (and our overall awareness of verified factors not apparent to many at the scene 
that day), there is a need for responders to future cataclysmic events to monitor 
quantifiable triggers, such as: 
• number of victims,  
• area involved,  
• types of attack methods used,  
 
which should compel (via written procedure, training, and practice) the use of alternate 
communications tactics and contingencies. The “walking wounded,” for instance should 
be encouraged to keep walking or redirected to a central treatment area, and radios should 
be used for priority messages only. Such strategic use of radio systems during disasters 
has not generally been part of first responder orientation and training to this point. 
An illustration of our lack of attention to individual training and procedures for 
radio use for first responders can be made by considering the typical subject areas in the 
training program for police officers. While use of the portable radio, which will be used 
many times every day, has been largely self-taught, areas like firearm use and evidence 
handling usually comprise several hours initially and are given periodic refresher 
training. Conversely, most field personnel only know how to use a fraction of the features 
on a typical portable public safety radio. When it comes to the portable radio, it’s 
unlikely that the officer knows much more than how to change a few channels and what 
button to use to push-to-talk. (In contrast, in 1995, when U.S. Air Force Captain Scott 
O’Grady was shot down over Bosnia, he used survival training he had received, including 
expert use of his portable radio, to conserve battery life for six days and to coordinate his 
own rescue over the radio. At present training levels, it’s hard to imagine our first 
responders doing the same thing.) 
The 9/11 Commission Report goes into great detail about the failings of the radio 
systems of the various agencies responding to the terrorist attacks.78 Transcripts and 
recordings reveal that there was almost constant chatter, albeit choppy and often 
unintelligible. Setting aside the technical issues, of which there were many, a lot of                                                  
78 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
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people still talked on the radio; so a lot was being said, but communication was weak. 
The emotion in their voices is obvious, as they give witness to a horrific scene, (shades of 
the 1937 Hindenburg crash recording, “Oh, the humanity!” which interestingly was not 
being broadcast live, and killed a comparatively few 35 people, yet the experienced radio 
announcer was choked with emotion). We have to anticipate that even hardened veterans 
will be at an operational deficit in their ability to control their emotions, when faced with 
the most intense of emergency situations. 
It is relatively easy to make any radio talk to another through patching equipment. 
Equipment being deployed now through homeland security grants will make patching 
equipment much more available than ever before. But if each user of the system intends 
to use their radio in the same manner as they normally would on partitioned systems, it 
will be far more difficult to manage the large increase in the amount of radio traffic that 
will be squeezed onto a common platform. The result is likely to be even heavier radio 
congestion, and less, rather than more, effective communication. 
Emergency responders develop habits during day-to-day, routine operations. In 
facing typical workday situations, they use the radio to get critical information, to request 
a back-up, redirect to correct locations, etc. Field personnel develop a level of familiarity 
and a comfort zone with procedures they have adopted over time. These habits become 
the default operating procedures during times of crisis. This phenomenon is attributable 
to human nature where we tend to revert to patterned behaviors during times of stress. 
This is the logic behind practice exercises before an emergency, much like the fire drills 
we all experienced as school children. In short, unless people have consciously 
considered an alternate behavior, before facing a crisis, we tend to go with what is 
familiar.  
Due to the criticality of communications during crisis events, it is imperative to 
devote resources to developing and implementing new procedures for responders during 
emergencies. This serves to increase awareness of the need for people to communicate 
differently in overload situations, instead of the typical practices of loading more and 
more radio traffic into common radio space, until communications turns are not 
accomplished, and responder safety and effectiveness is impaired. 
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By their very definition, high risk/low frequency events don’t occur very often. It 
takes a tremendous amount of interest, discipline, and insightful appreciation for the 
need, to prepare for something that only happens perhaps a handful of times in one’s 
career. This is a classic conundrum: how much time should we spend on something that 
may never happen? Post-9/11 management of first responders has pushed us into 
unknown territory, in this regard. Deciding on a prudent approach, appropriate for each 
locality, is one of the most pressing strategic issues of the next few years. 
 
B. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPROVED OPERATIONS 
Communications are at their most critical point during the response phase of an 
emergency. During the response phase, life safety matters are typically at their most acute 
state, with people waiting for rescue and treatment, coupled with a focus on intervention 
to the perpetrators, damage assessment, and general situational status reporting. These 
stressful missions tend to introduce the most emotionally charged communications during 
the first hour of the incident, even though the recovery phase may stretch for weeks and 
months.  
Anyone around emergency services for a few years will recognize the role 
adrenaline and other stress-related reactions play in altering voice pitch and inflection 
when someone is talking on the radio during a serious incident. This is the reason 
emergency personnel can leave their radios on all day, only half-listening to what is being 
said, but listeners immediately refocus their attention when someone is reporting 
something serious. As anyone who has listened to the aforementioned recording of a 
reporter describing the crash of the Hindenburg (“oh, the humanity!”) can attest, stress 
causes the human voice to take on a very unique quality, and the speaker can literally 
succumb to a state of “speechlessness.” Recognition of this reality will allow us to scale-
back our expectations of effective radio communications at intensive emergency scenes, 
seek alternative communications methods, and target our prioritization efforts, for 




Given the infrequency of disasters and the resultant lack of first-hand experience 
of individual participants, it will be important to capitalize on analogous lessons learned 
by the U.S. military, as well as first responder training and near-disaster situations. After-
action reviews offer great potential to gain attention, and affirmation regarding the need 
to improve communication procedures, before responders go back to their daily routines. 
In the hours and days following a major incident, the opportunity to gather information 
and identify causal factors is at its greatest, while the incident is still fresh in everyone’s 
minds and the momentum for change will be present. Although less precise and 
scientific, comments about communications garnered during after-action reviews provide 
a barometer of the degree of success regarding programs to implement improvements. 
The idea to keep in mind is that people revert to practiced behaviors when 
confronted with stressful situations. It is critical that the tendency of first responders to 
talk too much during an emergency be corrected. Spending more time listening to what is 
being said and saving precious radio spectrum for prioritizing life safety traffic only is 
essential—and represents a new policy that needs to be taught and practiced. This will 
require specific guidelines, training, practice and application by fire crews, patrol 
officers, public safety communications personnel, and their respective supervisors. 
The term Crisis Communications Plan has its widest usage in the private sector, 
referring to situations where a need exists to manage media relations for corporate 
viability, such as in product tampering situations, or corporate take-overs. In our context, 
the term applies to a situation where large numbers of first responders are operating at the 
scene of one or more emergencies, and the need to optimize scarce communications 
assets is most critical. 
The Crisis Communications Plan is advocated whenever command is established 
at the scene of an emergency where a large number of responders are present, and radio 
communications are beginning to degrade. Its features include: 
• Encourage face-to-face communication within NIMS sectors 
• Designate staging areas (where responders are directed to muster before 
deployment in the hazard zone) are to be designated by command, where 
units will report and return silently to staging officers at those locations, 
without radio usage 
 
83 
• Establish a dedicated communications path limited exclusively to 
command situation status reports and requests of additional resources 
from/to dispatch 
• Command and dispatch will coordinate with one another to broadcast 
situational status reports at regular intervals 
• Activate a periodic, soft beeping signal to be played over the radio 
channel, indicating to field units that life safety messages are to be 




In just a few short years, communications have risen to the very top of homeland 
security response concerns. While communications were a frequently cited concern in a 
number of after-action reports prior to 9/11, considerable momentum advocating change 
has developed since the release of the 9/11 Commission Report.79 
Reminiscent of the frenetic drive to fix computers prior to Y2K, the last few years 
have been marked by a frenzy of meetings, focus groups, studies, vendor-driven solutions 
and “last-minute-deadline” grant purchases aimed at improving radio interoperability. 
Even the phrase itself, “interoperability,” was not in common usage just four years ago. 
Now the mere mention of the word will fill a conference room and assure standing-room-
only at seminars. The well intentioned, but misguided, assumption by those driving the 
process has been that the main challenge is technical; make all the radios at an incident 
talk to one another, and improved “communication” will be the instant result. This 
ignores the reality of limited radio frequencies (“air time”) and the common occurrence 
of single agencies overwhelming their own radio channels. Simple logic will make it 
possible to anticipate the result if two or more agencies take their “beyond capacity” 
radio conversations from separate systems and tie them all together. 
With over one billion dollars allocated to homeland security grants, (including 
hundreds of thousands of dollars earmarked nationwide for interoperability purchases), 
and new equipment soon to arrive all around the country, it is imperative that we 
understand the negative impact likely to result if we do not change how we use radio 
resources. We have some choices to make regarding how to administer interoperability. 
                                                 
79 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004. 
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The greatest need is to modify procedures and the behavior they are designed to produce, 
both in daily use, as well as during disaster operations. We need to retrain field personnel 
in optimal radio operation procedures aimed at prioritizing radio transmissions for life-
safety, overall situational awareness status and broad command and control. 
This sounds easy, even self-evident, but it is very difficult for people faced with a 
crisis to do anything other than what they have practiced in routine, daily operations. The 
recommendations made represent a realistic set of alternatives for addressing the need to 
see the communications issue as a complex set of behaviors. These recommendations 
include engineering communications assets to fit the way first responders will tend to 
react in emergency situations and introducing the new technologies with commensurate, 






Transcript of North Texas area fire departments training exercise held October 17, 
2005, with analysis and comments added by the thesis author. 
 
E=Engine T=Truck M=Med. Unit (Ambulance)  
PSC=Public Safety Communications 
      Drill on October 17, 2005 - starts at 7:34:52 pm-ends 8:36:02 pm 
Turn  
# Time of Day 
Reviewer's 
Comment 
Text of the 
Message  
1 7:34:52 PM   Batt.177 En route 
2   Exclamatory! All Engines going to the floor investigation - STOP! 
3 7:35:18 PM   E419 you can go 
4     Excuse me E114 you can go 
5 7:35:39 PM   E114 you can proceed to the call 
6     
M494 would you tell E114 they can proceed to the call and its on 
channel 13 
7 7:36:42 PM Unacknowledged E3 hold up 
8 7:37:00 PM Repeat E3 hold up 
9     Richardson E3 Received 
10   Unacknowledged M494 you can go 
11   Repeat M494 you can go 
12 7:39:11 PM   E3 you can go 
13     E3 Received 
14     
E114 on scene we have a large 3 story structure; fire showing from 
the 3rd floor; lets go ahead and have a 2nd alarm on this; level 2 
staging we are going to enter the building with a line and initiated fire 
attack, next one in lay us a line, and also we're going to need a 
second line in coming behind us. 
15     PSC copy 
16     
E114 on scene large 3 story; fire from the 3rd floor; request 2nd 
alarm; level 2 stage 
17     T174 you can go 
18 7:40:30 PM   From John  
19     This is staging 
20   
 Radio Compatibility 
Issue; Resolved 
This is John Boyd go ahead and send one of the Batt. Chief now; go 
ahead and send him up we have a radio issue; nobody’s radio works 
on the channel so we'll get them up here and get things rolling right 
21     B177 you can go 
22     Richardson E3 is on the scene will be laying along the attack engine 
23     PSC copy Richardson E3 on the scene 
24 7:41:19 PM   E602 is En route 
25     T174 is on scene  
26     Received 
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27 7:41:52 PM   E172 En route 
28     Received E172 
29     B491 you can go  
30     E179 En route 
31     Received E179 En route 
32 7:42:33 PM Questionable 
E114 to incoming- we are going to need forced entry into the front 
door of the building. 
33 7:43:00 PM Redundant 
B177 out looks like 3 stories wood construction heavy fire 3rd floor 
B177 gonna be Command 
34     E602 you can go 
35     E602-going 
36     Received 602 En route 
37     
PSC copy B177 is Command 3 story wood construction heavy fire 
from the 3rd floor 
38     B177 to E114 
39 7:43:58 PM   
PSC to Capt. Stone please call public safety extension 7952; PSC at 
7952 
40     Command to E114 
41     T174 to Command 
42     Command to T174 go ahead 
43     
Command to T174; Dan what I want you to do is go ahead and set 
your aerial ladder... We're going to need ventilation on that vertical 
ventilation on that top floor there; once you get that set up let's make 
sure we got a fan in the stairwell so we want to keep that stair way 
clear as well, you're going to be ventilation group. 
44     T174 to Command 
45   Repeat Command to T174 did you receive my last message 
46     
I heard the end of it, you would like us to set up our fan and ventilate 
the stairwell is that correct 
47   Repeat 
That's affirmative, I want you to go ahead and set your aerial ladder 
vertically ventilate and make sure that stairwell is clear make sure that 
got a fan that stairwell as soon as possible  
48     
Received, we will set the fan first and we will extend our aerial ladder 
vertical ventilation 
49     E472 hold up; Prosper 1 hold up  
50     E472 Receive 
51     Prosper 1 Receive 
52 7:45:58 PM   Command to E114 
53     E114 go ahead 
54     What's your location right now 
55     
We're at the door along the fire at this time we're waiting for our crew 
for forcible entry ; we do have a preconnect on the ground at the front 
door 
56     
Received, just based on looking at the outside of the structure where 
you're standing I don't know that you'll be able to get to the fire from 
where you are, I’m probably going to send a crew around the back 
side to see if they can go up the stairs from the back side and get to 
the fire 
57   Questionable Received, we also did another looking around on the front 
58     E472 go ahead 
59     E472 on the way 
60     Command to Richardson E3 
 
87 
61   Confused E602 to Command were you calling us? 
62     Command to E602 
63     Command this is E602 go ahead with the traffic 
64     
I want you to go to the, we are going to call the west side of the 
building the A side I want you to go to the C side of the building, you'll 
probably going to need a high-rise pack in the back, see if you can 
find a standpipe, gain entry and gain access to the fire from the C side 
of the building 
65     
OK 10-4 E602 is going to the C side of the building to make a rear 
entry with high rise pack 
66     
Richardson E3 to Command we are available for assignment, we 
have laid a supply line to Carrollton engine 
67     Prosper E1 go ahead 
68     Prosper E1 receive 
69 7:48:39 PM Unacknowledged  E472 to Command 
70 7:48:55 PM  E472 to Command 
71     Command go ahead E472 
72     We're en route to your location ready for assignment 
73     
That's E472 I want you to pull around to the C side of the building, I 
want you to hook up to the standpipe back there and support the crew 
that's going up to the fire floor from the C side of the building 
74     
E472 received, we'll be, we'll be supplying the standpipe for the crew 
to go up the stairwell 
75     Received you'll be E602 going on that side 
76    Unacknowledged  E114 to Command 
77     E602 
78     
We have our doors forced open E114 is going in with a 1-3/4" hose 
line 
79     E178, M179 go ahead 
80     Richardson E3 to Command 
81     Command go ahead Richardson E3 
82     
E3 has laid a supply line to the Carrollton engine we are ready for 
reassignment 
83     
Received Richardson E3, I want you to bring a positive pressure 
ventilation fan to the C side of the structure, we're going to be using 
the stairwell back here we want that fan set up in the stairwell  
84     E112 to Command we're ready for assignment 
85     Receive hang on E112 
86     …(garbled)…………… 
87     B491 go ahead 
88     E472 to Command 
89     Command go ahead E472 
90   Questionable 
We're parked here behind E112 and we can't get through they need to 
move up a little bit 
91   Repeat Repeat, repeat your last message 
92     
10-4 we receive the message E112 was parked in front of us, we 
could not get through he has now moved at this time so we're moving 
to our (garbled) 
93   Unacknowledged  Received, Command to Richardson E3 
94 7:51:50 PM   E114 to Command 
95     Command go ahead 
 
88 
96     PSC to Command 10 minutes on scene 
97     Command received 10 minutes on scene 
98     T174 to Command 
99     Command go ahead T174 
100     
We have forced 1 door we have the fan set in the door they are 
advancing the hose line we'd like to force entry of another couple of 
these doors if that's alright 
101     
Received Dan I want y'all to go to the roof and open the roof up, open 
the area over the stairwell and make sure we got good ventilation 
vertical ventilation on the roof  
102     
Received we'll be sending a crew through the roof for vertical 
ventilation  
103     Command to Allen Batt. Chief 
104     B491 on the scene 
105     Received B491 
106     … (Covered) to Allen Batt. Chief 
107 7:53:37 PM   
Richardson E3 to Command are you ready for PPV in the C side rear 
entrance 
108     That's affirmative  
109     E3 received it's done 
110     Richardson E3 to … 
111   Unacknowledged Come in Richardson E3 
112     Richardson E3 to Command 
113   Repeat Go ahead Richardson E3 
114     
Richardson E3 to Command we have found that the alarm panel in 
the Charlie Delta corner, the alarm panel is showing smoke alarm 
activated on floors 3 and 4 the sprinklers are out due to valve trouble  
115     Received, the sprinklers are out due to valve trouble  
116    Unacknowledged B491 to Command  
117    Unacknowledged Command to E173 
118     Command to Richardson E3 
119 7:55:20 PM  Unacknowledged Prosper E1 to Command 
120     Richardson E3 to Command 
121     Command go ahead 
122     
Be advised we have found the blue print and have the location of the 
pump room if you wanted to check that out 
123     
Received I think I got Engine Richardson E3 in the pump room right 
now, what's your location  
124     
Be advised this is Richardson E3 and we are in the alarm room, not 
the pump room however. We have located the pump room and can 
make it to that location. Also be advised that the alarm is going off on 
the 5th floor at this time 
125     Received we have an alarm on the 5th floor at this time  
126     That's affirmative, would you like us to check out that pump  
127     Yes, go ahead and check the pump out  
128    Unacknowledged E114 to Command  
129   Questionable M179 on scene 
130     114 to Command 
131     Command go ahead 
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132     
E114 to Command and E114 driver, we need to charge the line, we're 
on the 3rd floor we're going to make entry as soon as our line is 
charged 
133     
Command received what's your visibility in there, how's your 
ventilation 
134     We temporarily cracked-open doors—moderate amount of smoke 
135     Received 
136    Unacknowledged E114—need an officer are you advising to charge the line? 
137     Command E472 
138     E472 go ahead 
139     
When you get hooked to the standpipe back here go ahead and take 
your crew; let's go up to the 3rd floor and work our way up checking 
the floors from this side over here 
140     E472 go up to the 3rd floor, check for survivors 
141   Repeat E114 you want water 
142   Unacknowledged Richardson E3 to Command 
143 7:58:17 PM Repeat Richardson E3 to Command 
144     Command go ahead 
145     
Richardson E3 Command be advised we found open drain valves in 
the water system we have closed them at this time. We ought to have 
some pressure 
146     Received… thank you 
147     Command to E114 
148     E114 go ahead 
149     OK you're going to be Division 3 
150     
Affirmative we're Division 3. We have (garbled) with us additionally 
we're going to need our hose charged 
151     
602 to Command we need the standpipe for this building charged, we 
need the standpipe charged from the outside 
152     We're hooked-up to the standpipe 
153    Repeat Command repeat that last message 
154    Unacknowledged E179 to Command, we're in the area, where is staging set up 
155   Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
156     Command to E179 don't stage….go ahead and come on down  
157   Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
158 8:00:24 PM Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
159     Command go ahead 473 
160   Repeat E472 to Command 
161     Command go 
162     
we're ready to support the standpipe on the C side, if you're ready 
than we'll charge it 
163     
Go ahead and charge the standpipe now and when you get your crew 
ready go ahead and take them inside and meet up with Division 3 
164    Unacknowledged 
10-4 we're charging the standpipe, we're meeting up with Division 3 
up on the 3rd floor. Is that going to be on the C side? 
165    Unacknowledged E114 to Command 
166     Command to E112 
167     E112 go ahead 
168     
Take your crew go inside and meet up with Division 3 they're probably 
going to need some relief pretty quick 
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169     Received 
170     
Is our engine parked in a good spot or do we need to park it out of the 
way? 
171     Where you're parked is fine 
172   Face-to-Face Use? 
E178 take your crew to the C side of the structure I want you to go in 
and back up E472 
173     E178… C side and back up E472 
174     E493 to Command 
175     Command go ahead 493 
176   Face-to-Face Use? I'm sitting here waiting for assignment 
177   Unacknowledged ...3 to Command 
178     Received- stand by 
179     E172 is out 
180     Received E172 
181     PSC to Command 20 minutes on scene 
182     Command received 20 minutes here 
183     Command to Division 3, are we making progress on the fire 
184     Division 3……. 
185   Repeat Command to Division 3, I didn't read the last transmission 
186     Command to Division 3 
187   Wrong Unit Ans. Richardson E3 go ahead 
188     
This is Division 3, we have … smoke, we can't knock down the fire 
we’re going to need a second line, also we have an alarm that are 
ringing and E1… will be coming down at this time  
189     Received 
190     
Carrollton E112, Division 3 says they're out of air coming out, go 
ahead and try to meet them coming out and get a report from them, 
they're on the A side 
191   Unacknowledged E112 Division 3 
192     Command to E172 
193     E172 
194     
Jay, can you come to the C side of the structure? I'm going to have 
you go to the 4th floor and be Division 4 
195     Received, report Bravo side, Division 4 
196   Confused Charlie side Division 4 
197     Received Charlie side, Division 4 
198   Unacknowledged Prosper Engine 1, E112 to Division 3 
199     Command to Prosper Engine 1 
200     Go ahead 
201   Unacknowledged Prosper Engine 1 to Command do you have traffic  
202 8:06:03 PM Unacknowledged Prosper Engine 1 to Command do you have traffic 
203   Unacknowledged Division A to Command 
204   Repeat Command repeat your last message 
205   Unacknowledged Division A to Command 
206     T174 did not (garbled) ventilation do you want another task for him? 
207     
Received, we're going to have to have ventilation, have them change 
the plan on whatever needs to be done to get them ventilation up 
there 
208     Division A received, we'll change the plan 
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209     Prosper Engine 1 in Command  
210     Command go ahead Prosper Engine 1 
211     Yes sir did you have traffic for us a moment ago  
212   Alt. Comm.-plus 
Yeah come back to the C side of the structure for face to face with 
Command, we're sitting on the B/C corner 
213     Received meet Command on the B/C corner 
214     E179 to Command  
215     E179 go ahead 
216     E179 and E493 are two companies still at staging 
217     Received 
218     
E179 go ahead and come down to Command, the B/C corner of the 
building for face to face 
219     Received E179 come to the B/C corner to confer with Command 
220   Exclamatory! All units hold your traffic, stand by, E602 to Command 
221     go ahead E602 
222    Exclamatory! 
We're got, we got fire on the first floor between the… bring the second 
hose line up here …we’ve got a lot of heat and smoke 
223     Received Command E178 
224   Unacknowledged Command 
225   Unacknowledged E178 
226     Command to 472 
227     Command to E472 
228 8:09:30 PM   E472 to Command 
229     Have you gotten a line up there to back up 472 on the 3rd floor? 
230   Unacknowledged 602 on the 3rd floor 
231   Unacknowledged Division A to Command 
232     Division 472 B to A 
233     476 go ahead 
234     Command wanting to know if you have a line to back up Division 3 
235     We're going to need a line up to the 3rd floor (garbled) 
236   Unacknowledged E114 to Command 
237     Division A to Command 
238     Command go ahead 
239     
T174 we're going to split the four crew up - we’re going to have 2 on 
the 1st floor -cross ventilation and 2 on the 2nd floor cross ventilation  
240     Received 
241   Exclamatory! E602 to Command  
242     E602 go ahead 
243     
Ok let me know on the status on the second… be advised we got a lot 
of flames across the ceiling 
244   Repeat Repeat your last transmission 
245     
We're checking for fire extension on the floor above us, we got a lot of 
fire on the 4th floor  
246   Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
247     Command to 
248   Unacknowledged E3 to Command 
249     Command to 602, go ahead and withdraw from that location 
250   Exclamatory! E602 copy, E602 going to withdraw ……… 
251     Division. 3 (garbled) 
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252   Unacknowledged  Command to E172 do not go to the 4th floor 
253   Unacknowledged E114 to Command 
254     Command to Division 3 
255     Division 3, go ahead 
256     
I want you to go ahead and withdraw from the 3rd floor, withdraw to a 
safe location, get out from underneath the wood trusses 
257   Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
258   Unacknowledged E114 to Command 
259   Unacknowledged Division. 3 (garbled) 
260   Repeat Repeat again 
261     PSC to Command 30 minutes on scene 
262   Unacknowledged E114 to Command 
263 8:14:15 PM   Division. 3 to Command- we have withdrawn to a safe location 
264 8:14:34 PM   E602 what's your location 
265     E602 withdrawing from the stairwell, going down the 1st  
266     Received 
267     Division 3 to Command 
268     Division 3 Command to Division 3 
269    Repeat We are withdrawing to a safe location in the hallway  
270     Command to Division 3 
271     Division 3 go ahead 
272   Unacknowledged 
I want you to make sure everyone is out of the floor area there into at 
least the stairwell as relocation and let me know when that has been 
accomplished  
273   
Questionable, 
Unacknowledged 
E114 to Command we're setting up rehab on the C/B corner of the 
building  
274 8:16:14 PM Unacknowledged Division 3 to Command 
275 8:16:40 PM   Division 3 to Command 
276     Command go ahead, having trouble understanding you 
277     Division 3 everybody in the stairway 
278     Received 
279   Unacknowledged T174B to Command 
280     Division A to Command 
281     Command go ahead 
282     We still have heavy fire on the A side with smoke flared back up  
283     Received 
284     T174B to Command 
285     Command go ahead 
286     
We have fire on the 5th floor when you can get a hose line up here 
please 
287   Repeat Repeat your last transmission 
288     We have had heavy smoke - free burning fire, get a hose line 
289     What's your location? 
290     We're in the 5th floor 
291     Received, go ahead and withdraw through the stairwell 
292     Received, we will be going to the stairwell  
293     E114 to Command 
294     Command go ahead 
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295    Repeat 
You didn't receive my message earlier we’re manning rehab at the 
C/B sector, also at this time we have a 2 man crew here, E114 is 
available to be reassign if you need us 
296     Receive E114 thank you 
297     ……………to Command 
298     E602 to Command 
299     Command to E602 
300     Our company's out of the building, we're changing air bottles  
301     Received 
302     Command to all units 
303     Withdraw from the structure  
304     
Command to Division 3 let me know when all of your crew are out of 
the building, Command to Division 4 let me know when all of your 
crew is out of the building 
305   Unacknowledged T174B to Command 
306   Unacknowledged T174B to Command 
307     ……………….to Command 
308     Standby for emergency traffic 
309     Standby for emergency traffic 
310     Abandon the building; Abandon the building 
311     
Standby for a PAR (Personnel Accountability Report), where ever 
you've exited the building 
312     Command to PSC 
313     Command go ahead 
314     I need you to do the signal for to abandon the building 
315     ****signal noise***** 
316     
All units abandon the structure, abandon the structure, abandon the 
structure 
317     Division 4 to Command we have a PAR… 
318     
Command receive, Division 3 go ahead and let me know which units 
you have PAR with? 
319     E602 is off of 1 
320   Repeat Repeat that 
321     E602 is off of 1 Engine 1 
322     Received E112 do you have PAR? 
323     Yes affirmative, we have PAR 
324   Unacknowledged Division. 1 to Command 
325     E472 do you have PAR? 
326     E472 we have PAR 
327     E114 do you have PAR? 
328     E114 has a PAR 
329     M494 do you have PAR? 
330     M494 has PAR 
331     Richardson E3 do you have PAR? 
332     Richardson E3 has PAR 
333     T174 do you have PAR? 
334     T174 have PAR 
335     M179 do you have PAR? 
336     M179 has PAR 
337     E178 do you have PAR? 
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338     E178 has PAR 
339     E172 do you have PAR? 
340     E172 has PAR 
341     E493 do you have PAR? 
342     Par 
343     E179 
344     E179 has PAR 
345   Unacknowledged Command to T174 
346   Repeat Command to T174 
347     T174 to Command go ahead 
348     
Go ahead and set up your aerial master stream for defensive 
operations on the A/B corner  
349     
Received, you want us to put water in the 3rd floor A/B corner 
window? 
350     Received 
351     Command to E178 
352     E178 
353     
Go ahead and set up for defensive operations on the B/C corner, go 
ahead and set your aerial master stream for that 
354     Received E178 will be setting up master stream on the B/C corner 
355 8:24:57 PM   T174 to Command 
356     Command go ahead 
357     Who would you like us to get water from? 
358     Go ahead and get it from the initial attack engine if you need to  
359     Received and that is Carrollton 114 
360     I believe so, Command to Richardson E3 
361     Richardson E3 go ahead 
362     
If possible go ahead and set up for defensive operations on the A/B 
corner with your aerial apparatus 
363   Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
364     PSC to Command 40 minutes on scene 
365     Command received 40 minutes on scene 
366   Unacknowledged T174 to Command 
367     
We're going to be detaching the standpipe on the side street, we'll be 
bring the aerial in and making room for aerial device 
368     Command to E472 
369     E472 go ahead 
370     
Go ahead and use your deck gun, defensive operations back there, 
make sure you're not in the collapse zone 
371     10-4 E472 be going to defensive 
372     That's affirmative go ahead and use your deck gun there 
373     brought back here… 
374     Richardson E3 to Command 
375     Command go ahead 
376   Unacknowledged 
Richardson E3 to Command be advised our path is blocked by 5" 
supply hose we are on the A/D corner if you want to set up aerial 
operations there 
377     …. E602 bravo 
378   Repeat Repeat traffic 
379   Unacknowledged T174 to Command 
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380     call T174 
381     E4…. 
382     
Received we will be going through a fog and we are already applying 
water in the 3rd floor window 
383     
Received, Command to Richardson E3 go ahead and use your aerial 
device where you are  
384     E3 received, be advised we are going to need water supply  
385     Received 
386     E178 A E178 
387     E178 go 
388     Just pull up behind this engine and we'll take water from them  
389     I've been advised by ……this is B/C corner where we're at right here 
390   Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
391 8:28:55 PM Repeat E472 to Command 
392     Command go ahead 
393     
We have a monitor master stream C side, 3rd story we have room for 
an aerial if you pull up here beside us 
394     Receive 
395 8:29:26 PM   E602 to Command 
396     Command go ahead 
397     
This is E602 we have our 50 ft aerial in position where the water 
supply, do you want us to enter the same side of the truck? 
398     Receive you can hit the B side that will be good 
399 8:32:00 PM   E472 to Command 
400     Command go ahead 
401     We're ready on the C side for the aerial to get them water 
402     
Receive I don't think we have one to get them over to you right now, 
thank you 
403     
We already have 5" line hooked up from E472 to aerial. Did you 
want… 
404     Received ok, thank you 
405     PSC to Command 50 minutes on scene 
406     Received 50 minutes on scene 
407 8:32:55 PM Unacknowledged E472 to Command 
408 8:33:17 PM   E472 to Command 
409     Command go ahead 
410     Did you want us to send water from 472 to the aerial on the C side 
411     That's affirmative 
412     10-4 it's on the way 
413 8:33:53 PM   
Richardson E3 to Command be advised we have aerial ladders set 
and water flowing onto the 5th floor A/D side 
414     Received are you making any progress on the fire? 
415     Fire appears to be darkening on the 5th floor 
416     Received 
417     E472 to Command 
418     Command go ahead 
419     Fire is darkening on the C side 
420     Received thank you 
421 8:35:02 PM   E178 to Command 
422     Command go ahead 
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423     E178 is set and operating in master stream 
424     Received let me know on your progress 
425 8:35:42 PM   E472 to Command 
426     Command go ahead E472 
427     Is E178 aerial getting sufficient water pumping water? 
428     Command all units discontinue the drill the drill is over 





    
  Communications Anomaly Analysis Summary 
 % of Turns # of Turns Anomaly Type 
 11.9% 51 Unacknowledged Message 
 4.9% 21 Needed to be Repeated 
 2.6% 11 Confused/Unclear/Questionable Value 
 1.2% 5 Exclamatory/Excited Message 
    
    
 
97 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Al'Absi, M., S. Bongard, T. Buchanan, G.A. Pincomb, J. Licinio, W.R. Lovallo. 
“Cardiovascular and Neuroendocrine Adjustment to Public Speaking and Mental 
Arithmetic Stressors.” Psychophysiology 34 (May 1997): 266-275. 
 
Becker, Melanie, James Burns-Howell, John Kyriakides, Derek Smith. IS Team 
Effectiveness Factors and Performance. University of Cape Town, South Africa: 
Department of Information Systems, 1997. 
http://www.commerce.uct.ac.za/informationsystems/Research&Publications/Pubs
2000/ER05.pdf (Accessed November 8, 2005). 
 
Bolia, Robert S., W. Nelson, W. Todd, Michael A. Vidulich, Brian D. Simpson, and 
Douglas S. Brungart. Communications Research for Command & Control: 
Human-Machine Interface Technologies Supporting Effective Air Battle 
Management. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH : Air Force Research 
Laboratory. http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2005/10th/CD/papers/279.pdf 
(Accessed November 10, 2005). 
 
Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. “Report for the Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN).” 
Comparisons of Conventional and Trunked Systems. May 1999. 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F04A685D-5902-4655-BBBB-
7251DCDF4693/0/Conventional_Trunked_Radio_Systems_Comparison_Report.
pdf (Accessed November 3, 2005). 
 
Butler, E. A., B. Egloff, F.H. Wilhelm, N.C. Smith, E.A. Erickson, and J.J. Gross. “The 
Social Consequences of Expressive Suppression”. Emotion 3 (2003): 48–67. 
 
Calfee, Lt. Sharif H., U.S. Navy, and Neil C. Rowe. Institute for Modeling, Virtual 
Environments, and Simulation (MOVES) and Computer Science Department, 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Multi-Agent Simulation of Human Behavior in 
Naval Air Defense. 
http://www.cs.nps.navy.mil/people/faculty/rowe/calfeepap.htm  (Accessed 
September 11, 2005). 
 
Cannon, W. B. Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage: An account of recent 
research into the function of emotional excitement. 2nd Edition. New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1929. 
 
CBS News, “Army Recruits Video Gamers.” March 30, 2004. 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/03/30/ eveningnews/main609489.shtml 




Cherry, E. C. “Some Experiments on the Recognition of Speech, With One and With 
Two Ears.” Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 25 (1953): 975-979. 
 
Cronkite, Walter. A Reporter’s Life. New York: Random House, 1996.  
 
Davidson, Paul. “Compatible radio systems would cost billions.” USA Today, December 
29, 2005. 
 
Department of Homeland Security. National Incident Management System (NIMS). 
Washington, D.C., 2004. 
 
Department of Homeland Security. Press Release: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security Launches Office of Interoperability and Compatibility; Offers States and 
Locales Tools for Improving Public Safety Communications Interoperability. 
September 27, 2004. 
 
Department of Homeland Security. Project SAFECOM’s Near-Term Initiatives, The 
SAFECOM Program. Washington, D.C., 2004. 
 
Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service Film, “The Colebrook 
Incident,” film dialogue. 
 
Edwards-Winslow, Frances Ph.D. “Telling It Like It Is: The Role of the Media In 
Terrorism Response and Recovery.” Perspectives on Preparedness. John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (August 2002): 2. 
 
Fedarko, Kevin and Mark Thompson. “All For One.” Time, June 19, 1995. 
 
Fogarty, W. M. Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing 
of a Commercial Airliner by the USS Vincennes (CG49) on 3 July 1988. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Navy, 1988. 
 
Goldfarb, Daniel A. Ph.D., Gary S. Aumiller, Ph.D.. 10 Reasons Cops are Different. 
www.heavybadge.com (Accessed August 23, 2005). 
 
Hayden, Peter, Assistant Chief, FDNY. Staff Statement Number 13, National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company. 2004. 
 
Hutchins, Susan G. “Decision making errors demonstrated by experienced naval officers 
in a littoral environment.” in C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein, Naturalistic Decision 






Irving, Larry. Final Report of the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee (PSWAC) 
to the Federal Communications Commission and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration. Washington, D.C., n.p., 
1996. 
 
Kerr, Jennifer C. “Lack of Interoperability Hampers Agencies.” Associated Press, 
October 16, 2005. http://www.wjla.com/news/stories/1005/269201.html 
(Accessed December 12, 2005). 
 
Klein, Gary. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. 
 
Lewis Miller, Nita, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, and Lawrence G. 
Shattuck, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. A Process Model of Situated 
Cognition in Military Command and Control, 2004. 
 
Lund, Donald A. “The Lessons of Non-Interoperability in Public Safety Communication 
Systems, The ATLAS Project, Advanced Technology in Law and Society.” 
Benchmarks and Blueprints. University of New Hampshire, April 2002. 
 
McCarley, Jason S., and Christopher D. Wickens. “Human Factors Concerns in UAV 
Flight.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Institute of Aviation, 
Aviation Human Factors Division, 2004. 
 
McEwen, Harlin R. “Special Focus: Wireless Public SAFEty Interoperable 
COMmunications: Safecom.” Police Chief Magazine, April 2004. 
 
Mobile Radio Technology. “Coverage proof of performance: Hocus-pocus or real 
world?” May 1995. 
 
Morrison, Herbert. Radio Broadcast. The Hindenburg Broadcast, May 6, 1937. 
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/vohind.htm (Accessed October 15, 2005). 
 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Eleventh Public 
Hearing. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, May 18, 2004.  
 
National Fire Protection Association. NFPA 1600: Disaster/Emergency Management 
and Business Continuity Programs. Quincy, Massachusetts, 2004. 
 
National Task Force on Interoperability. Why Can’t We Talk? Working Together To 
Bridge the Communications Gap to Save Lives. A Guide for Public Officials. 
February 2003. 
http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM/library/interoperabilitybasics/1159_





Newsday, Inc. “Audio: Dramatic Radio Transmissions from September 11.” 
http://www.newsday.com/news/local/newyork/ny-
tapesgallery,0,785678.htmlstory (Accessed October 28, 2005) 
 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, Office of 
Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Fiscal Year 
2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, Program Guidelines and Application 
Kit. 2004. 
 
Police Chief Magazine. “Police 10-Codes.” October 2005.  
 
Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee. Interoperability White Paper. April 1996: 
3-4.10. 
 
Richer, Jeffrey P. Ph.D. Scottsdale (AZ) Community College, Unpublished curriculum. 
http://www.sc.maricopa.edu/sbscience/ psy266/lessons/essays/essay9.html 
(Accessed October 28, 2005). 
 
Rigg, Nancy J. “Maintaining Control, North Hollywood Bank Robbery & Shootout.” 9-
1-1 Magazine. February 28, 1997. 
 
Smith, Jonathan S. “Work Channel: A Practical Guide to Improved Radio 
Communication, A Guide for Public Officials.” 9-1-1 Magazine, July/August 
1997. 
 
Terwilliger, Michael S., “Captain In Charge?” Fire Chief Magazine, April 2003. 
http://firechief.com/news/firefighting_captain_charge/index.html (Accessed on 
December 22, 2005). 
 
The News-Sentinel. Communications a Weak Spot in Hospitals’ Disaster Preparedness. 
Fort Wayne, IN., October 16, 2005. 
 
The NIMS Integration Center, DHS/FEMA. National Standard Curriculum Training 
Development Guidance. October 2005. 
 
The Washington Post. “Unprepared.” [Post-Hurricane Katrina Editorial] September 5, 
2005: A30. 
 
Thomas, Evan. “How Bush Blew It, Bureaucratic timidity. Bad phone lines. And a 
failure of imagination. Why the government was so slow to respond to 
catastrophe.” Newsweek, September 19, 2005. 
 
Van Breda, L. Operator Performance in Multi Maritime Unmanned Air Vehicle Control. 




von Kuenssberg Jehle, MD Dietrich, David G. Wagner, James Mayrose, Usman 
Hashmi. “Seat Belt Use By Police: Should They Click It?” Journal of Trauma-
Injury Infection & Critical Care 58(1), January 2005: 119-120. 
 
West, Pat. “Family Talk Plan.” Fire Chief Magazine, June 2004. 
 
Wickens, Christopher D., John Lee, Yili Liu, and Sallie Gordon Becker. An Introduction 





























INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Bruce Glasscock, Executive Director 
City of Plano 
Plano, Texas 
 
4. Greg Rushin, Chief of Police 
City of Plano 
Plano, Texas 
 
5. Robert Acker, Fire Chief 
City of Plano 
Plano, Texas 
 
6. C. J. Howard, Asst. Emergency Management Coordinator 
City of Plano 
Plano, Texas 
 
7. William Peterson, Director 
FEMA Region VI  
Denton, Texas  
 
8. Kelly Stone 
Director of Homeland Security 
Collin County, Texas 
 
9. John Merklinger, Director 
Emergency Communications Department  
Rochester, New York 
 
10. John Cassin, Supervisor,  
Emergency Communications Department 
Rochester, New York 
 
 
